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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to §78-2-2(4) Utah 
Code Annotated and pursuant to Rules 3 and 4, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Inasmuch as this is an appeal from a Summary Judgment, a 
correctness standard applies, without according deference to 
the trial court's decision. State vs. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 
1994) ; Mountain States Tel. & Tel, vs. Garfield County, 811 
P.2d 184 (Utah 1991); Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. vs. Dixie 
Power and Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24 (Utah 1990). All facts are 
to be viewed in the light most favorable to the losing party. 
The View Condominium Owners Association vs. MSICO, LLC, 2004 UT 
App. 104, 514, 497 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. The correctness standard 
applies to all issues. All issues are preserved by reason of 
lower court Memorandum Decision and Order dated April 21, 2004 
(R. 990-1008, Addendum No. 1). Issues to be decided on appeal 
are: 
A. Whether Salt Lake County's slope ordinance which 
prohibits construction of structures on slopes which exceed a 
30% grade constitutes an unconstitutional taking when applied 
to a building lot in a platted pre-existing residential 
subdivision; and if so, is plaintiff's case ripe for the 
entitlement of just compensation. 
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B. Whether appellant is entitled to rescind his purchase 
contract on the grounds of mutual mistake. 
C. Whether appellant is entitled to rescind his purchase 
contract on the grounds of breach of covenant under a warranty 
deed, and particularly the covenant against enctimbrances. 
D. Whether Utah recognizes an implied warranty of 
fitness for purpose, and if so, whether there that been a 
breach of said implied covenant. 
APPLICABLE COSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
A. Constitutions: 
Amendment V, Constitution of the United States 
"nor shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation". 
Article I, Section 22, Utah Constitution 
"private property shall not be taken or damaged 
for a public use without just compensation". 
B. Statutes: 
§17-27-810 
"If the legislative body is satisfied that 
neither the public nor any person will be materially 
injured by the proposed vacation, alteration, or 
amendment, and that there is good cause for the 
vacation, alteration, or amendment, the legislative 
body, by ordinance, may vacate, alter, or amend the 
plat, any portion of the plat, or any street or lot". 
C. Ordinances: 
Salt Lake County Takings Relief Ordinance 
Attached hereto at Addendum No. 2. 
o 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant Jason Arnell purchased a residential building 
lot in a platted subdivision from defendant Truman G. Madsen 
and paid cash in the amount of $95,000. At the time of the 
sale neither the buyer nor the seller were aware of a County 
slope ordinance which prohibited building on any lot with a 30% 
or greater slope. This lot exceeded the slope limitation, 
although many other homes existed in the subdivision along the 
very same slope. Salt Lake County has denied appellant the 
right to build on the lot, thereby making it valueless for any 
viable economic purpose. Appellant claims that the actions of 
Salt Lake County constitute an unconstitutional taking under 
which it is obligated to pay appellant just compensation. 
Appellant also claims that he is entitled to rescind the 
purchase contract under theories of mutual mistake, breach of 
covenant under a warranty deed, or breach of an implied 
covenant of fitness for purpose. All parties to this action 
filed motions for summary judgment Arnell's motion for summary 
judgment was denied. Salt Lake County and Madsen's motions for 
summary judgment were granted. This appeal followed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment was submitted to 
the trial court on the following undisputed facts. 
1.- On or about May 4, 1999, plaintiff Jason Arnell 
purchased a subdivision lot near Brighton, Utah from defendant 
Truman Madsen for the sum of $95,000. (Admitted in pleadings; 
R. 1, 11, 68, 81, 89). The description of the lot is as 
follows: 
Lot 13, Forest Glen, plat "B" according to the official 
plat thereof recorded in the office of the Salt Lake 
County Recorder. 
2. Arnell purchased the subdivision lot for the purpose 
of constructing a canyon residence. (R. 135). 
3. The property was conveyed from Madsen to Arnell by 
Warranty Deed. (R. 253, 257) . 
4. The subject lot is part of a platted subdivision 
which was approved by Salt Lake County in 1970 after the 
subdivision developers met all of the County's subdivision 
requirements. (R. 135). 
5. After the approval of the subdivision, Salt Lake 
County, in August, 1997, enacted an ordinance which prohibits 
the building of structures on canyon lots having a slope of 
thirty percent (30%) or more. (R. 212). It is admitted that 
the subject lot exceeds 30%. 
6. Although the lot has a steep slope, there is nothing 
about the lot or its location that would make it unsafe or 
unfeasible to build upon. See unchallenged pre-filed testimony 
of plaintiffs, architect, and engineers (R. 187-193, 201-207) 
together with County response concurring with such opinions (R. 
194) . 
7. At the time of the purchase of the lot other homes 
existed along the same slope on other lots in the subdivision. 
(R. 135). 
8. At the time of the purchase of the subdivision lot, 
neither Arnell nor Madsen had knowledge of the slope ordinance. 
(R. 135, 255). 
9. After learning of the slope ordinance, Arnell made 
application to the Salt Lake Board of Adjustment for a 
variance. After a hearing, the variance was denied on February 
16, 2000. (Alleged at R. 119 and admitted at R. 264, 324). 
10. Salt Lake County has a Takings Relief Ordinance (the 
Ordinance) which sets out a procedure for obtaining relief 
where an unconstitutional taking of property is claimed. 
Plaintiff filed a Petition with Salt Lake County seeking relief 
under the Ordinance. (Salt Lake County Takings Relief 
Ordinance, R. 141, attached hereto as Addendum 2; Takings 
Relief Petition at R. 163). 
11. Under the Ordinance, the first step requires a 
preliminary determination that a takings had occurred. Salt 
Lake County made a "Preliminary Determination of Taking" on 
March 28, 2000. (Letter from Salt Lake County of April 6, 
2000; R. 185). A Hearings Officer was then appointed to 
conduct the hearing and make recommendations to the County 
Commission. Robert A. Thorup of the law firm of Ray, Quinney & 
Nebeker was appointed as the Hearings Officer. (Letters from 
Salt Lake County of April 5, 2000 and April 6, 2000; (R. 182, 
185) . 
12. Mr. Thorup thereafter moved forward and conducted two 
hearings. In doing so, the Hearings Officer requested that the 
sworn testimony of all witnesses be submitted ahead of time in 
writing, and that the witness then be available for cross-
examination at the hearing. Such written sworn testimony was 
duly submitted by petitioner. Salt Lake County submitted an 
unsworn proffer. For the most part there were no significant 
facts in dispute. (Petitioner's pre-filed evidence in support 
of Takings Relief Ordinance R. 187-193; letter response from 
Salt Lake County dated July 25, 2000 R, 194-196; petitioner's 
rebuttal to pre-filed evidence; R. 201-207). 
13. Prior to the hearing Mr. Thorup advised the parties 
that he intended to make findings on seven factual matters as 
listed in §19.93.040 of the Ordinance, and that his conclusions 
would be based upon these findings. The seven factual 
determinations were to be: 
(1) Whether petitioner had complied with the 
recjuirements for providing information to be submitted 
under the Ordinance. 
(2) Whether petitioner had a protectable interest in 
the property. 
(3) The market value of the property considering the 
existing zoning regulation. 
(4) The market value of the property under the 
proposed use. 
(5) Whether there are other economically viable uses 
that may be made of the property. 
(6) The market value that may exist if there is an 
opportunity for cluster development. (This category is 
not applicable to the subject case). 
(7) Whether construction on the property is 
feasible. Prior to the hearing, Salt Lake County 
stipulated that the petitioner had met items 1 and 2 and 
that 6 was not applicable. (Alleged at R. 120, and 
admitted at R. 264, R. 415 and Rule 7(c)(3)(B), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure). 
14. After taking the matter under advisement, Mr. 
Thorup rendered his decision on September 11, 2000. 
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Findings on all seven of the categories were made in favor 
of petitioner. He found: 
(1) That petitioner had complied with all 
requirements for submitting information. (Finding 14; R. 
213); 
(2) That petitioner was owner of the property and 
had a protectable interest. (Finding 15; R. 213); 
(3) That the market value of the property if the 
existing slope ordinance is applied is substantially zero. 
(Finding 16; R. 213) 
(4) That the market value based upon the proposed 
use without regard to the zoning ordinance is $95,000. 
(Finding 17; R. 213) 
(5) That there are no other viable uses for the 
property. (Finding 18; R. 213). 
(6) That from an architectural, engineering and 
soils standpoint, the construction of a residence on the 
subject property is feasible. (Finding 20; R. 213) 
Notwithstanding the sweeping factual findings in favor of 
petitioner, Mr. Thorup found that petitioner Jason Arnell had 
no standing to bring the action because he acquired the 
property after the passage of the zoning ordinance. Because of 
his perception of a lack of standing, he recommended to the 
County Commission that the Petition for Relief be denied, (See 
p 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Decision 
is attached hereto as Addendum 3). 
15. After the rendition of Mr. Thorup's decision, 
petitioner submitted a request for rehearing and 
redetermination. The Request was based primarily upon the fact 
that petitioner had never been asked, nor had he ever been 
given the opportunity to address the standings issue. The 
request was in the form of a five-page letter which thoroughly 
briefed all of the arguments and authorities on the standings 
issue. (See letter of October 4, 2000, from David E. West 
requesting rehearing and reconsideration, R. 216). 
16. After receiving counsel's request for a rehearing, 
Mr. Thorup wrote to Salt Lake County suggesting a date for the 
rehearing. (See letter of October 6, 2000, from Robert Thorup 
to Salt Lake County; R. 221). He received a response from the 
District Attorney's office advising that until the County 
Commission meets on this matter that the County not be required 
to respond to any petition for reconsideration. (Letter of 
October 12, 2000, from Deputy District Attorney Kent Lewis to 
A. R. Thorup; R. 222). Mr. Thorup therefore did not proceed to 
hear or rule upon petitioner's request for reconsideration. 
17. On July 5, 2001, as a courtesy, Mr. Thorup wrote a 
letter to both counsel calling their attention to a United 
States Supreme Court case, Palazzolo vs. Rhode Island, decided 
Q 
June 28, 2001. That case specifically holds that an assignee 
or a grantee of property has standing under the United States 
Constitution to bring a condemnation action for inverse 
condemnation. That case, with respect to the standings issue, 
would be controlling here. (See Robert Thorup's letter of July 
5, 2001, together with copy of complete Decision in Palazzolo 
case; R. 223-234). 
18. Counsel for petitioner replied to Mr. Thorup's letter 
by calling his attention to the fact that the request for 
rehearing and reconsideration had not as yet been ruled upon; 
reviewing the arguments as previously made; and in light of the 
Palazzolo decision, requesting Mr. Thorup to amend his 
recommendation to the Salt Lake County Commission. (See David 
E. West letter of July 10, 2001 to Robert Thorup; R. 235) . 
19. Robert Thorup responded to counsel's July 10, letter 
in the following manner: He sent a one page letter to counsel 
advising that he could not conduct post-decision proceedings 
because he had not been authorized to do so by the County. 
(Thorup letter of July 12, 2001; R. 238). He also wrote a 
scathing letter to Salt Lake County criticizing the way in 
which the matter had been handled; expressing his personal 
offense for having been mislead by the County and having 
suffered an impairment to his reputation for not being 
permitted to act independently; and advised the County that the 
Palazzolo case overruled his previous recommendation decision. 
He further pointed out that as it now stood his "recommended 
decision found that a taking had occurred without just 
compensation". (Letter of Robert Thorup to Salt Lake County of 
July 18, 2001; R. 239; attached hereto as Addendum 4). 
20. Following all of the above, the matter was ultimately 
presented to the Salt Lake County Council. The Council heard 
oral arguments and elected to totally ignore the recommendation 
and findings made by its Hearings Officer. Although the 
Council heard no evidence, it directed the County Attorney to 
prepare entirely new findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
These findings and conclusions addressed a multitude of issues 
outside the scope of plaintiff's Petition of Relief and upon 
which no evidence was ever presented. The decision denied 
Arnell's Petition for a building permit or for compensation. 
(Alleged at R. 124, and admitted at R. 264, R. 415, and Rule 
7(c)(3)(B) U.R.C.P.; copy of complete Decision is attached 
hereto as Addendum 5). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Issues Against Salt Lake County 
1. The United States and Utah Constitutions prohibit the 
taking of private property without the payment of just 
compensation. 
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2. Where a statute or ordinance denies all economically 
beneficial or productive use or land, compensation is required 
under the takings clause. 
3. The Salt Lake County slope ordinance deprives 
appellant of all economically viable use of his subdivision 
building lot, 
4. Salt Lake County has made it clear that it will not 
permit development of the subject lot, and the case is 
therefore ripe for the granting of relief. 
Issues Against Defendant Madsen 
1. At the time of the lot purchase agreement between 
Arnell and Madsen, there was a material assumption that the lot 
was buildable. 
2. Neither party was aware of the Salt Lake County slope 
ordinance. 
3. The existence of the slope ordinance which makes the 
lot valueless and unbuildable was a material mistake of fact 
enabling the buyer to rescind the purchase contract. 
4. A second and separate ground for allowing recession 
is based upon breach of covenant under a warranty deed. The 
property was conveyed to appellant by warranty deed. The 
existence of the slope restriction constitutes a breach of the 
covenant against encumbrances. 
1 O 
5. As a third and separate ground appellant should be 
entitled to rescind the purchase contract based upon the breach 
of an implied covenant of fitness for purpose. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE HAS BEEN AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING 
OF PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY 
A. The Taking. Amendment V of the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution 
prohibit the taking of property without just compensation. A 
taking can be in the form of a physical taking or a regulatory 
taking. A regulatory taking may exist where state or local 
laws impose unreasonable restrictions upon the use of property. 
A regulation which falls short of eliminating all economic 
benefit may constitute a taking depending upon the extent of 
interference, the type of regulation, and the extent to which 
reasonable investment backed expectations have been destroyed. 
Lucas vs. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 
S.Ct. 2886 (1992). But these factors need not be addressed 
here because it is clear that one definite rule has emerged: 
Where a land use restriction deprives or renders a property 
valueless for any economically viable use, there is an 
unconstitutional taking. Palazzolo vs. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 
606, 121 S.Ct. 2448 (2001); Lucas vs. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, supra; Agins vs. City of Tiberon, 447 U.S. 225, 100 
S.Ct. 2138 (1980); Smith Investment Company vs. Sandy City, 985 
P.2d 245 (Utah App. 1998). See also dissenting opinion of 
Judge Orme in B.A.M. Development vs. Salt Lake City, 2004 UT 
App. 34, 493 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 138 wherein the subject of 
regulatory takings is discussed in detail. 
In the instant case, the slope regulation of Salt Lake 
County clearly amounts to a confiscation or deprivation of the 
property. This is a residential subdivision lot having no 
other viable purpose than a site for a residence. The County 
regulation and the actions taken by the County have reduced its 
$95,000 value to zero. The lot is otherwise feasible for 
construction. The County itself made a preliminary 
determination that a taking had occurred. The matter was 
referred to an independent Hearings Officer who conducted 
hearings, took evidence, and made detailed findings concluding 
that a takings had occurred. Yet in spite of this, the County 
Council, in not wanting to set a precedent that might apply to 
others in Arnell's position, ignored its own Hearings Officer, 
and, without holding further hearings or taking evidence, made 
its own findings. In doing so, the County completely ignored 
the seven categories which under its own taking ordinance 
determined whether a taking has occurred; extolled the virtues 
and purposes of the slope ordinance; made non-evidentiary 
assumptions relating to water availability; and made arguments 
and assumptions relating to non-existent construction problems 
which challenge the uncontroverted engineering testimony, 
including the testimony given by its own County geologist. The 
Salt Lake County slope ordinance may well be a desirable 
regulation, but, it cannot usurp the requirement to pay just 
compensation as guaranteed in the Utah and United Stated 
Constitutions. 
B. Ripeness. As a result the Palazzolo decision, Salt 
Lake County no longer challenges plaintiff s standing in which 
to bring this action. It no longer makes any challenges to the 
timeliness of plaintiffs claim (a defense raised in the trial 
court) , nor does it seriously dispute any of the legal 
principles set forth in subsection A above. What it now 
argues, and what it successfully persuaded the trial court to 
do, is that(relief be denied on the basis of ripeness A In 
other words, it argues that Salt Lake County has never really 
and truly denied plaintiff the right to construct a building on 
the lot. This argument is unconvincing in light of the long 
history as to what has transpired, and the plain language of 
the County decision. Nor is it constitutionally supportable. 
When plaintiff first made application to the Board of 
Adjustment he sought only a variance from the slope ordinance. 
No other relief was even claimed. Plaintiff has never asked to 
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be relieved of any building codes or safety regulations which 
may be in place, including any engineering requirements for 
safe construction or other building restrictions. The meeting 
Agenda shows only that Arnell was seeking a variance from the 
slope ordinance. The issue before the Board of Adjustment was 
the slope ordinance, and the slope ordinance alone. 
The County argues that had the plaintiff come to the Board 
of Adjustment with specific building and site plans, that the 
result might have been different. They now argue that the 
County has never said that a variance would necessarily be 
denied if such detailed information had been furnished. They 
would suggest that the owner should incur as much as $10,000 in 
architectural and engineering fees before appearing before the 
Board to request a variance from the slope ordinance.1 But why 
should any reasonable person ever be required to incur 
thousands of dollars in expenses before he knows whether he can 
build anything at all. This would be like committing to a 
1
 One of the dissenting members of the Board of Adjustment, 
Kevin Oakes, raised this very issue. His transcript states: 
It is unfair to ask someone to spend in excess of $10,000 on 
reports until we can grant a variance saying that yes, he can 
possibly build on that lot with the stipulation that he meet 
the ordinance and any safety conditions that we would impose 
upon him . . . I do have some real concerns about the safety 
issues and it will cost the applicant in excess of $10,000 to 
prove or disprove the fact that it is safe or unsafe to build 
on that lot. It bothers me that we would take away is right to 
build". 
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construction contract, or to the purchasing of custom 
furnishings, before one knows whether a building will be 
permitted. 
The County argues that it wants to control what is built 
and is unwilling to give variances that run with the land. But 
the whole point is that plaintiff is entitled to a variance 
that runs with the land, subject of course, to all other 
legitimate building restrictions. 
The same is true with respect to Arnell's Petition for 
Relief under the County's taking ordinance. Plaintiff's 
detailed Takings Relief Petition addressed only the slope 
ordinance. The hearings and the evidence presented likewise^ 
addressed only the slope ordinance. The findings of the 
hearings officer focused only on the slope^rdinance. And 
although the County Council, in its conclusions, made 
references to water requirements and other requirements outside 
the scope of any evidence that was presented, the ultimate 
denial was based upon the slope ordinance. The conclusions 
list a whole host of possible problems that conceivably are 
associated with slopes, and stress that the County does not 
want to set any precedents that would allow construction on 
sloped lots. It makes a point to recite that the slope 
requirement has been in force by the County for twenty-five 
(25) years, clearly implying that the County is not about to 
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depart from its policy now. It is very clear from the opinion 
that the denial is based upon the slope ordinance generally and 
not upon the failure of the applicant to supply some detailed 
engineering detail. The whole tenor of the opinion makes it 
crystal clear that the providing of more detailed plans to the 
County would have made no difference whatsoever. 
What the County now seems to be saying is that it hasn't 
ever unconditionally stopped Arnell from building, and now, 
after four (4) years of litigation, tells him that he is 
certainly free to start over. They would even add that maybe 
if Arnell spends enough money for detailed architectural and 
engineering fees, we might reconsider. This carrot is, of 
course, totally illusory in light of the County's formal 
decision. And, under the law, Arnell is only reguired_jfco^  
exhaust his administrative remedies once - not repeatedly. 
The argument raised by Salt Lake County that the door is 
still open for further consideration is the same argument made 
and rejected in the case of Palazzolo vs. Rhode Island, supra. 
In Palazzolo a property owner was precluded from developing 
wetlands. There it was argued successfully to the trial court 
that the matter was not ripe for decision because even though 
Rhode Island had denied petitioner the right to fill wetlands, 
there was still doubt as to the extent of development that 
would be permitted. Thus, the reasoning went that although 
petitioner's grandiose development proposal was denied, there 
was still the possibility that lesser uses might be permitted, 
and that the court could not know for sure the extent of the 
development that would be permitted. This argument was flatly 
rejected by the United States Supreme Court. The Court 
acknowledged that a landowner may not establish a taking before 
a land use authority has had an opportunity to determine the 
extent of the permitted usage, but government officials may not 
burden property by the imposition of repetitive or unfair 
procedures in order to avoid a final decision. In Palazzolo 
the Council would have been permitted to allow exceptions where 
"a compelling public purpose" is served, but the Council's 
decision found that the petitioner did not satisfy the 
"compelling public purpose" standard. This removed any further 
discretion as the parties were all in agreement that the 
ordinance forbids the fill of wetlands for any purpose and with 
no fill there could be no structures (just at the Salt Lake 
County ordinance forbids the construction on slopes that exceed 
thirty percent). The ultimate holding was that when a State 
agency charged with the enforcement of land use regulations, 
entertains an application from an owner, and the denial of the 
application makes clear the extent of the development 
permitted, federal ripeness rules do not require the submission 
of further applications. 
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In the instant case the County has acted. The action 
includes findings that the granting of any exception or 
variance would defeat the purpose of the Wasatch Canyons Master 
Plan (Conclusion Number 8 of Salt Lake County's Decision); 
would open the door to having to provide similar relief to lot 
owners similarly situated (Conclusion Number 8); that strict 
enforcement is a proper exercise of the police power to 
increase overall safety and value to other property (Conclusion 
Number 6); that construction on slopes per se presents a host 
of other problems enumerated in Conclusion Number 5; that 
Arnell's lot may not be able to comply with the requirements of 
other agencies (Conclusions Number 3 and 4); and concludes that 
steep lots are nearly impossible to service, protect or develop 
in an environmentally sensitive manner (Conclusion Number 2). 
One cannot read these findings and glean any ray of hope that 
the County would waive the slope requirement under any 
circumstances. The findings are totally incompatible with any 
reasonable expectation that Salt Lake County will allow 
construction if more detailed construction plans are submitted. 
C. Penn Central Transportation vs. New York City. 
Although the trial court acknowledged that Palazzolo was the 
controlling authority, it moved to the earlier case of Penn 
Central Transportation vs. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 98 
S.Ct. 2646 (1978) which it heavily relied upon in denying 
on 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. Yet, Penn Central 
isn't remotely similar to Palazzolo, nor to the instant case. 
In Penn Central the plaintiff s use of a terminal building was 
designated as a historical landmark, thereby restricting the 
destruction or the alteration of the building. The U.S. 
Supreme Court found that the landmark designation was not a 
"taking" within the meaning of the 5th Amendment. The holding 
was largely based upon the fact that the landmark law did not 
interfere with the terminal's present use; that Penn Central 
was realizing a "reasonable return" on its investment; that the 
law did not impose any drastic limitations upon the ability of 
the owner to use the property; and that the preservation of 
historical buildings was a desirable thing to be encouraged. 
The fact that these may have brought about some diminution of 
value, as is the case with ordinary zoning laws, does not of 
itself constitute a taking. Penn Central does not involve a 
situation, or even a claim, that the owner has been deprived of 
all viable economic benefit of the property, and it does not 
support the holding of the trial court. The court simply does 
not need to look behind the more recent case of Palazzolo vs. 
Rhode Island, supra, which, as previously stated, stands for 
the proposition that ripeness rules do not require repeated 
applications once the decision of the regulatory authority 
makes clear the extent of development that will be permitted. 
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A very recent Utah case appears to be in harmony with the 
federal ripeness cases. The View Condominium Owners 
Association vs. MSICO, LLC, 2004 UT App. 104, 235, 497 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 3. Here the town of Alta entered into an agreement 
with PUD Developers which included the removal of an earlier 
snow storage designation upon what had been designated as Lot 
9. Such action would have serious impact upon owners of 
property in adjoining lots, as it would limit snow storage 
space and may require that the town would have to enjoin or 
limit occupancy of adjoining lots during snow periods. The 
owners claim for an unconstitutional taking was dismissed by 
the trial court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the 
trial court's decision, holding that there were sufficient 
facts to establish that government action had substantially 
lessened the value of the property and interfered with the 
owner's right to the use and enjoyment thereof. Although the 
issue of ripeness was not specifically addressed, the facts of 
the case clearly established that no physical taking, or the 
extent thereof, had actually yet occurred. 
D. Other Flaws in the Decision of the Trial Court. In 
addition to the inappropriate reliance upon Penn Central, there 
are other major flaws in the decision of the trial court. Some 
of these flaws are as follows: 
1. At page 15 of the decision, Judge Medley makes 
reference to the fact that relief may have been denied by 
the County because it was not clear whether plaintiff 
could connect to a public sewer or otherwise comply with 
adequate sewer access. This was never an issue before the 
Board of Adjustment, nor was it an issue before the 
Hearings Officer. It is a conclusion that the County 
made, without taking any evidence, after it directed the 
County Attorney to disregard the findings of the Hearings 
Officer and rewrite the findings. It also was an issue 
specifically addressed in Palazzolo. In Palazzolo the 
same argument was made that the petitioner may not have 
been able to satisfy the requirements of other agencies, 
specifically such as the allowance of individual sewage 
disposal systems. The U.S. Supreme Court found this 
argument to be irrelevant and held firm to its holding 
that repetitive applications are not required after the 
regulatory agency makes it position clear. 
2. Judge Medley suggests at page 16 that there may 
have been multiple reasons for the County's denial of 
relief, among which was the plaintiff's failure to supply 
the County with more detailed information. Plaintiff has 
always claimed that he supplied the County with 
information requested, and the record does not reflect 
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otherwise. But whether he did or didn't becomes rather 
irrelevant in light of the language of the County 
decision. The message from the County is not that it 
would like to see more plan detail before granting 
permission to build. It is a clear message that we aren't 
going to allow construction on non-conforming lots, 
period. 
3. Even Judge Medley acknowledges at page 10 that, 
"the language which the County chose provides at least 
colloquial support for the contention that the decision 
precludes any building on the lot, and hence, deprivation 
of any economic value in the land". He then quotes the 
broad language of the decision and goes on to say that the 
language was used after receiving plaintiff's data which 
the Board of Adjustment had earlier found lacking. He 
then concludes that the absence of said reports (a fact 
not in evidence) made it impossible for the County to act 
knowingly on plaintiff's request to determine whether the 
requirements for granting a variance had been met. There 
is no logic at all to this conclusion. One cannot assume 
that if the County had been satisfied with soil reports 
and detailed construction plans, that the rest of its 
decision would be ignored. The County decision is 
anything but vague. The reasoning for the rejection 
O/l 
applies to all sloped lots, not just those whose owners 
supply satisfactory soil reports. 
4. Throughout Judge Medley's decision he makes 
reference to the fact that the regulation of homebuilding 
on mountainous slopes is a proper exercise of the County's 
police power, and to allow exception would defeat the 
purpose of the master plan. But this is not justification 
to deny relief. The mere fact that the County may be 
acting within its police power does not excuse it from 
paying just compensation when private property is 
destroyed. It cannot exercise powers that are forbidden 
by the Constitution. Coleman vs. Utah State Land Board, 
795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990). 
5. At page 6, Judge Medley comments on the 
undisputed fact that other non-conforming homes are 
already in existence along the same slope, and argues that 
this fact actually supports the County, reasoning that it 
would be in the public interest for the County to mitigate 
the damage that is already done. Yet there is not a shred 
of evidence anywhere for the trial court to conclude that 
the existing homes are causing any damage. And further, 
such argument wouldn't excuse the County from its 
constitutional obligation to pay just compensation anyway. 
6. At page 7 Judge Medley further comments that 
after the variance was denied, and during the takings 
relief process, there were delays in reaching a final 
decision because the County was giving the plaintiff 
additional time to bring in studies of the type the County 
would like to see and so that County officials could 
evaluate the data. During this period, Judge Medley 
concludes, that the parties were trying to negotiate a 
resolution. Judge Medley then speculates that no 
resolution was reached and that the data supplied 
apparently did not convince the County that the slope 
ordinance effected the taking of plaintiff's property. 
But there is no evidence to support this conclusion. 
Whatever settlement discussions took place, if any, were 
privileged. And during this period the County had already 
been advised by it's duly appointed Hearings Officer, 
after two evidentiary hearings, that an unconstitutional 
taking had already taken place. When the County Council 
elected to disregard the recommendation of the Hearings 
Officer, and to rewrite his findings without taking new 
evidence, or without taking part in the evidentiary 
hearings, it could not pull new facts out of thin air. It 
elected to base its denial on broad principles that apply 
to all sloped lots. That being so, the County is in no 
position to say to plaintiff that its decision wasn't 
final. 
E. The actions of Salt Lake County in depriving 
plaintiff of the use of his property have been illegal. Since 
the inception of this case plaintiff has argued to the County 
that its actions in depriving him of the right to build is in 
violation of §17-27-810 Utah Code Annotated. That statute is 
part of the title and chapter setting out procedures that must 
be followed in order for the legislative body to vacate or 
amend a platted subdivision, and provides as follows: 
"If the legislative body is satisfied that neither 
the public nor any person will be materially injured by 
the proposed vacation, alteration, or amendment, and that 
there is good cause for the vacation, alteration, or 
amendment, the legislative body, by ordinance, may vacate, 
alter, or amend the plat, any portion of the plat, or any 
street or lot".2 
Obviously a finding of no material harm to Mr. Arnell 
could not be made if the slope ordinance applies. 
Strict requirements must be met for subdivision approval. 
Once the subdivision is platted and approved for residential 
construction, the lot owners are entitled to rely upon the 
subdivision approval, and §17-27-810 established a form of 
After the initiation of these proceedings §17-27-810 was 
amended to eliminate the requirement of no material injury to 
individual persons. Interestingly the amendment was an 
innocuous part of an extremely lengthy amendment which amended 
twenty-two sections of the Utah Code, and the title of the act 
makes no mention of this specific change. 
97 
preexisting rights that came into existence. To later pass an 
ordinance which prohibits the use of subdivision lots is 
nothing more than an amendment of the subdivision, which 
according to State law cannot be done without following the 
strict procedures for subdivision amendment, including the 
required finding that no person will be materially injured by 
the amendment. Salt Lake County cannot circumvent the 
amendment process by a back door ordinance which ignores the 
legislative requirements. 
Salt Lake County should not be permitted to now benefit 
from its illegal action by being relieved of its constitutional 
obligation to pay just compensation. 
POINT II 
ARNELL WAS ENTITLED TO RESCIND THE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
BASED UPON A MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT 
In addition to his claim against Salt Lake County, Arnell 
sought alternative relief against the seller Madsen to rescind 
the Purchase Contract based upon a mutual mistake of fact. It 
is undisputed in this case that Arnell was purchasing the lot 
for the purpose of building a residence, and that neither party 
was aware of the County slope ordinance or other restrictions. 
These are very material assumptions that go to the very core of 
the Purchase Contract. It has been stated in Mooney vs. GR & 
Associates, 749 P.2d 1174 (Utah App. 1987) that: 
"A party may rescind a contract, when at the time the 
contract is made, the parties made a mutual mistake about 
a material fact, the existence of which is a basic 
assumption of the contract". 
The above quote fits the instant case to a "t". The slope 
ordinance was in place when the contract was made. And it just 
can't be seriously disputed, either objectively or 
subjectively, that a basic assumption of the Contract was that 
a platted building lot in a residential subdivision was in fact 
a lot upon which a structure could be built. Otherwise there 
would have been no purpose to the Contract. 
The trial court in its decisionJaxushed off the mutual 
mistake argument with a two sentence statement at page 17 to 
the effect that there can be no mutual mistake of "an existing 
fact" and that the County's refusal to grant a variance was a 
future act, not an existing fact. But this mischaracterizes 
the facts here. This just isn't a case like Kiahtypes vs. 
Mills, 649 P.2d 9, (Utah 1992) relied upon by Madsen, where the 
property was purchased with a specifically described mortgage 
which the parties knew about and which the seller undertook the 
obligation to get removed. When he couldn't get the mortgage 
removed he claimed a mutual mistake of fact in that the parties 
thought that the mortgage could be removed. The court in 
Kiahtypes held that the principle of mutual mistake doesn't 
cover future expectations. But that situation is entirely 
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different. This isn't a case where plaintiff purchased non-
conforming land hoping or expecting to get a variance in the 
future. When the sale was made, both parties understood that 
the lot was buildable. Nor is this a case where plaintiff 
bought property which became the subject of a future zoning 
ordinance or restriction. \The unknown slope limitation was in 
place at the time of the sale and the parties didn't know about 
it. Nothing could be more existing. 
The trial court further ignored^ArneJLl' s authorities which 
strongly support his position. Three easels closely in point 
are as follows: 
Rancourt vs. Verba, 678 A.2d, 8&6 (VT 1996) was a case 
involving a building lot which the buyer purchased for the 
purpose of building a lakeshore residence. He paid $112,000 
for the lot. He later learned that he could not get a building 
permit because of federal wetlands restrictions. The buyer was 
allowed to rescind the contract because of the mutual mistake 
of both parties believing that it was a buildable lot. It is 
difficult to see how any case could be closer to the instant 
case. The only differences are that Arnell's was a canyon lot 
rather than a waterfront lot; he paid $95,000 rather than 
$112,000 for the lot; and the building restriction was a slope 
violation rather than a wetlands violation. 
In Lovier vs. Meteye, 260 So.2d, 377 ((LA 1972) a buyer was 
permitted to rescind a sale where the sole W ^ o n for 
purchasing the property was for the development of a commercial 
enterprise, but where the property was zoned residential rather 
than commercial, and where both the buyer and the seller 
labored under a mistaken belief. /< \ 
Millman vs. Swan, 127 S.E. 166/(VA 1525) involved the 
purchase of a lot which both parties believed to be outside the 
town fire limits. The distinction was important because if the 
lot were to be within the limits, there were oppressive 
building restrictions that would make construction much more 
costly. Thus, lots outside the limits were more valuable. 
Both parties were of the mistaken belief that the lot was 
outside the fire limits when in fact it was inside. Because of 
this mutual assumption, and because the cost of construction 
would be much more than contemplated, the vendee was allowed to 
rescind. 
The decision of the trial court makes no reference to any 
of the above authority. Nor does it make any attempt to 
distinguish or to otherwise cite any contrary authority. The 
concept of mutual mistake is simple and straightforward. The 
trial court simply erred in not applying it. 
POINT III 
ARNELL IS ALSO ENTITLED TO RESCIND THE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
BASED UPON A BREACH OF COVENANT UNDER THE WARRANTY DEED 
A second and separate ground to rescind the Purchase 
Contract is a breach of covenant under seller's Warranty Deed. 
The property was conveyed by Warranty Deed. §57-1-12 Utah Code 
Annotated provides that all warranty deeds contain certain 
covenants, among which the grantor "guarantees the grantee 
that the premises are free from all encumbrances; and the 
grantor will forever warrant and defend the title thereof in 
the grantee". Thus, the question arises as to whether the 
slope restriction in the instant case is an encumbrance. 
Madsen took the position, and the trial court agreed, that 
a building restriction, as a matter of law, is not an 
"encumbrance" as that term is used in the warranty deed 
statute. There is some support for that position in the cases 
of Flemitis vs. McArthur, 226 P.2d 124 (Utah 1951) and 
Mortenson vs. Financial Growth, Inc., 456 P.2d 181 (Utah 1969), 
although both cases are distinguishable and in conflict with 
more recent Utah case law. 
In Flemitis the language relied upon by Madsen is as 
follows: 
"Purchasers of land must take notice of public 
restrictions restricting the use of the granted premises 
and such restrictions constitute no breach of covenant or 
warranty". 
The above language, however, must be taken in the context of 
the case where it was given. Flemitis was not a zoning case. 
Nor was it a building restriction or building use case. It was 
a case where a land patent had reserved certain water, mining 
and easement rights. A subsequent buyer in the chain of title 
viewed these reservations as encumbrances and refused to pay to 
seller the full amount of the purchase price. In its decision 
the court emphasized that the reservations recited in the 
patent, which were based upon public statutes, were also on 
record on the county recorder7s office. So the holding was 
based not only on the existence of the public statute but on 
the additional fact that the document reserving the easements 
was publicly recorded - a pretty important fact not existing in 
the instant case. Had the document not been recorded the 
result may well have been different. 
Mortensen vs. Financial Growth, supra, then comes along 
later and recites the same language from Flemitis. Mortensen 
likewise was not a zoning case nor a case involving building 
restrictions. Mortensen involved the sale of a farm at a sales 
price of $537,000. The buyer didn't make the first payment of 
$152,730. The excuse was that the federal and state government 
owned mineral rights on the property and it was argued that 
since this was an encumbrance he was excused from making the 
payment. The court didn't buy this argument and allowed the 
seller to terminate the contract for the failure of the buyer 
to make payment. In doing so, the court cited Flemitis to the 
effect that under the circumstances of this case, the fair 
assumption was that the reservation created by a public law was 
not an encumbrance. Then in tailoring this comment to the 
facts of the case made references to multi-recitals in the 
purchase contract all relating to such things as irrigated 
land, dry farm land, range land, water rights and similar 
matters, and pointing out that "there is no reference 
whatsoever, and indeed no hint concerning mineral rights". It 
was just not a purpose for which the land was being purchased, 
so the defaulting buyer was unable to carry the day with his 
"encumbrance" argument. The reservations in Mortensen and 
Felmitis, having minimal impact on the property use, are quite 
different from a restriction that renders the property useless. 
The more recent cases define the term "encumbrance" in 
much broader terms. Most recently, the definition is given in 
Holmes Development, LLC vs. Cook, 2002 UT 38, 48 P.3d 895, 
where it is stated: 
"This court has defined an encumbrance as "any 
interest in a third person consistent with a title in fee 
in the grantee, if such outstanding interest injuriously 
affects the value of the property", Hancock vs. Planned 
Dev. Corp., 791 P.2d 183, 183 (Utah 1990), or "constitutes 
a burden or limitation upon the rights of the fee title 
holder", Bergstrom vs. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123, 1124 (Utah 
1984). 
See also Brewer vs. Peatmoss, 595 P.2d, 866 (Utah 1979); 
Booth vs. Wyatt, 54 Utah 550, 183 Pac. 323 (1919). Thus, if 
the interest of Salt Lake County in prohibiting development 
injuriously affects the value of the property, or constitutes a 
burden or limitation upon the rights of the fee holder, it 
comes within the above definition. This definition has been 
recited over and over again in the recent cases. The 
definition of the rule doesn't make any exception for zoning 
ordinances. And although plaintiff would acknowledge the 
existence of authority to the effect that zoning 
classifications per se, and reasonable building restrictions 
may not be actionable, one would be hard pressed to seriously 
argue that a restriction such as the one here, which literally 
makes the property useless for any viable purpose, is not an 
encumbrance. Even Madsen himself acknowledged that it was his 
intention to warrant against any outstanding interest that 
would injuriously affect the value of the property. (R. 254). 
The above being true, Arnell is entitled to rescind the 
purchase contract based upon a breach of warranty and recover 
his purchase price, plus interest. See Bergstrom vs. Moore, 
677 P.2d 1123, (Utah 1984) holding that where there is a breach 
of the covenant against encumbrances under a warranty deed, the 
rescission damages are the amounts paid for the property, less 
any rental value (the subject lot being unbuildable has no 
rental value). 
POINT IV 
ARNELL IS ENTITLED TO RESCIND THE PURCHASE CONTRACT BASED UPON 
A BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF FITNESS FOR PURPOSE 
Under appellant's independent theories of mutual mistake 
and breach of warranty deed, there is no reason to reach the 
issue of implied warranty. But if for some reason the court 
determines that no mutual mistake exists, or that the building 
restriction is not an encumbrance, there still is, or ought to 
be, an implied covenant that the building lot is in fact a 
building lot and can be used for the only purpose to which it 
is suitable. Such an implied covenant has historically been 
recognized in sales of personal property. See codification at 
§70A-2-315 Utah Code Annotated. Although the statute itself 
does not apply to real estate, the reasoning and policies of 
the Uniform Commercial Code have been carried over into real 
estate transactions. At 67A Am. Jur. 2d, Sales, §701 it is 
stated as follows: 
". . . courts may imply warranties of fitness in 
connection with the sale and leasing of real estate, 
viewing the Code's warranty provision as evidencing a 
trend to warranties of fitness or as a statement of public 
policy embodying the foremost legal thought in commercial 
transactions. Thus, the implied warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose has been extended to apply to the 
purchase of a new condominium and to an air-conditioning 
unit that is an integral part of the condominium". 
(Citations omitted). 
The Utah courts have established that there is no implied 
warranty of habitability in real estate sales involving 
structures. American Towers Owners Association vs. CCI 
Mechanical, Inc. 930 P.2d, 1182 (Utah 1996). This is because 
the buyer has an opportunity to thoroughly inspect the property 
and satisfy himself as to the condition of the structure before 
he purchases it. A buyer may not even want to inhabit the 
building. However, American Towers acknowledges that in Utah 
the doctrine of implied warranty of habitability applies to 
leases. This was established in Wade vs. Jobe, 818, P.2d 1006 
(Utah 1991). Our case, of course, does not involve a building 
that is subject to inspection. So if the opportunity for an 
inspection element is removed from the equation we are much 
closer to the lease than to a sales situation - in which event 
an implied covenant of fitness for purpose ought to exist. 
Nobody in this case challenges the proposition that both the 
buyer and the seller understood that the purpose of the sale 
was to enable the buyer to build a home. 
There are other Utah cases that have dismissed implied 
warranty claims in real estate situations where the sales 
contract by its terms specifically excludes enumerated 
warranties such as merchantability, fitness for a particular 
purpose, and habitability. Fennell vs. Green, 2003 UT App. 
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291, 77 P.3d 339; Tibbitts vs. Openshaw, 18 Utah 2d 442, 425 
P.2d 160 (1967). Such reasoning would have to assume that in 
the absence of such exclusionary language in the contract, that 
implied covenants exist. In the instant case there is no 
contract between the parties which excludes any implied 
warranties. That being so, there is no reason why the concept 
of fitness for purpose shouldn't apply. The rationale 
justifying this concept is no different in the sale of a 
building lot than it would be in the sale of a motor-home, a 
furnace, or a refrigerator. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon all of the arguments and authorities as 
contained herein, appellant submits that the Summary Judgment 
of the trial court be reversed; that appellant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment be granted; and the appellees' respective 
Motions for Summary Judgment be denied. 
DATED THIS £& day of July, 2004. 
Q.0&L 
David E. West 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
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ADDENDUM NO. 1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JASON P. ARNELL : MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 020901035 
vs. : 
SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF 
ADJUSTMENT AND TRUMAN G. MADSEN : 
Defendants. : 
Before the Court are the parties1 respective Motions for 
Summary Judgment, pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 7. 
Having considered the Motions, the Memoranda submitted by the 
parties, and oral argument by counsel, the Court enters the 
following decision: 
BACKGROUND 
In 1999 Plaintiff purchased a canyon lot near Brighton, Utah 
from Defendant Truman Madsen for $95,000, for the purpose of 
building a cabin. The lot in question, platted as lot 13 of the 
Forest Glen subdivision which is within what is called the 
"Foothills and Canyons Overlay Zone" ("FCOZ"), contains an average 
grade which exceeds 40%--and portions are at or above 50%. During 
the planning stages of the project, Plaintiff was made aware that 
construction upon properties within the FCOZ containing an average 
grade in excess of 30% is restricted, and so sought a variance. At 
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a hearing held February 16, 2 0 00, after_ expressing concern 
regarding the lack of specific data for plaintiff's proposed use^ 
the Board of Adjustment denied plaintiff's request, and informed 
plaintiff of his right to seek his remedy from the County's takings 
board. On March 14, 2000, plaintiff timely filed an action in 
this Court for review of the Board of Adjustment decision, but the 
parties later stipulated to dismissal of the action without 
prejudice, "subject to refiling." 
Shortly after the Board of Adjustment decision, plaintiff 
filed his takings petition with the County. On March 28, 2000, the 
County preliminarily found that a takings may have occurred, and 
appointed a hearing officer to conduct further proceedings and 
issue a recommendation. The hearing officer's September 11, 2000 
decision, relying upon the parties' evidentiary proffers, 
recommended denial of the claim. While the decision was supported 
by a finding that plaintiff possessed a compensable interest in the 
property, it held that plaintiff's claim warranted dismissal 
because he did not have standing to assert it, having purchased the 
land after the passage of the FCOZ ordinance. Plaintiff sought 
rehearing, but his request was denied. The Board of County 
Commissioners took no immediate action upon the recommendation, at 
least in part to provide plaintiff further opportunity to provide 
them with site-specific data supporting his plan to build on the 
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lot. During the interim, on June 26, 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court 
decided Palazzolo v. State of Rhode Island 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
Upon learning of the decision, the hearing officer delivered to 
counsel for the County and for plaintiff the Palazzolo decision as 
a courtesy. In his letter of July 18, 2001, the hearing officer 
opined that "it is clear that the Palazzolo case overrules my 
recommended decision and will govern subsequent proceedings." On 
November 13, 2001, the County Council reviewed plaintifffs 
petition, considered the meaning and scope of Palazzolo, and on 
January 8, 2002 filed its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
denying plaintiff's petition. This action followed. 
ANALYSIS 
APPEAL OF BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT ACTION 
Timeliness of Appeal 
The County initially contested plaintiff's right to now 
challenge the Board of Adjustment decision. It is undisputed that 
the plaintiff's first action appealing the Board's decision was 
filed within the 3 0-day appeal period. The parties entered into a 
Stipulation dismissing that action and reserved plaintiff's right 
to re-file at a later date, which plaintiff did, just a week after 
the stipulation was signed. 
This Court's dismissal of the previous action was expressly 
without prejudice, "subject to refiling (sic)." Honoring 
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plaintiff's reservation of, and upholding the County's stipulation 
to, plaintiff's right to re-file is consistent with Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-40. Based thereon, plaintiff's appeal is timely. 
Furthermore, defendant Salt Lake County withdrew its challenge to 
the timeliness of_plaintif f's action with regard to the Board's 
di 
Five elements or requirements must be satisfied to qualify for 
a variance (see, Utah Code Ann., Section 17-27-707 
elements include: fl(l)/ (litefa/ enforcement of the zoning ordinance 
would cause an unreasonable hardship for the applicant that is not 
necessary to carry out th^generaj purpose of the zoning ordinance; 
cumstances attached to the property that 
cio^ jiot generally apply to properties in the same district; /(3)j 
re are specia 
granting the variance is essential to the enjoyment of a 
substantial property right possessed by other property in the same 
district; /j_4jL the variance will _not^ substa.ntially affect the 
general planC^nd/will not h^jTrm^jraryj-o t-hp public interest: f(5)J 
the spirit of the zoning ordinance is observed/and)substantial 
justice done, 
First, An this case, while it is conceivable that some plan 
for building might meet the "minimal scarring" purpose, the 
"prohibition of degradation" purpose, and the "aesthetic" purpose 
ARNELL V. S. L. COUNTY 
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT PAGE 5 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
contained in the ordinance, the recommendation of_the staff was 
tjjat the prohibition, even on lots already in existence at the time 
of the adoption of the FCOZ ordinances, on construction on slopes 
greater than 40%, was necessary^to carry out the general purposes 
of the zoning ordinance. On the question of "whether the literal 
enforcement of the zoning ordinance would cause unreasonable 
hardship," it is clear hardship is located on or associated with 
the property for which the variance is sought, but not that the 
hardship comes from circumstances peculiar to this property. The 
record supports the cQjaclue-±-eB-~thaj^  slope is an issue for nearly 
all of l^ ig^ JiQjLsL in the area. The hardship was not self-imposed or 
economic (the subject of the variance request was plaintiff's 
ability to build, not how much more it would cost plaintiff to 
build because of the ordinance) -J The record supports a conclusion 
that literal enforcement of the zoning ordinance under the 
— — _ ^ 
circumstances presented to the Board would not create a hardship 
that is unreasonable, given that plaintiff did not provide an} 
specific evidence at the time of the hearing that the negative 
/effects the ordinance was designed to ameliorate would be 
sensitively addressed in plaintiff's development of the property. 
>condy there are no special circumstances_attached to the 
property that do not generally apply to properties in the same 
district. The special circumstance, if any, is the slope, and this 
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clearly relates to plaintiff's inability under the ordinance to 
build upon the lot. However, it is not the slope itself that 
prohibits development of this lot, or any other lot in this 
subdivision with comparable slopes, but rather the existence of the 
slope ordinance--and as previously addressed, enforcement of the 
restriction under the circumstances before the Board was not 
unrea^S^le. 
L, it is true that absent a grant of the variance sought -^? 
here, plaintiff would be denied a right to build upon his lot--the 
very purpose for creating this subdivision. ttkw&«-/p(f^^^^^^T^^^C^ 
F^oui^ th/ granting the variance must not substantially affect 
the general plan or be contrary to the public interest. The 
plaintiff's argument here is clear that any harm that may result 
from building upon this lot is minimized because there already 
exists development in the area which is not in accordance with the 
plan. However, this observation supports the argument for the 
County as much as it does plaintiff's contentions, as it would be 
in the^putAic interest to mitigate the damage already done. 
/, the spirit of the zoning ordinance must be objpe^r^d, 
andfsubstantial justice done. The Board concluded that this element 
was not met because the very purpose of the ordinance is to prevent 
construction on slopes of this magnitude. In reaching their 
decision, it was clear that they were concerned that very little 
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data had been generated to support plaintiff's claim that the lot 
was safe to build upon. After this request for variance was 
denied, a substantial portion of the delay in reaching a decision 
on the takings petition was because the County was giving 
additional time for plaintiff to bring studies of the sort the 
County would have liked to see at the initial hearing to the 
commission, and so other-county officials could evaluate that data. 
As the time for decision approached, the County represented that 
they were trying to negotiate a resolution. None was apparently 
reached, the data supplied did not persuade the County to grant 
plaintiff's request, and did not convince the County that the 
ordinance effected a taking of the plaintiff's property. 
The decision of the Board is supported in the way that such 
decisions should be--the i nform^f -j pn whj r^hj22/^n^1' f f was jto provide 
did not convince the County that the HpfprminaHnn_ t"hat~ th^ 
variance wottW.not comply with the spirit of the zoning ordinance, 
- y — - - ^ ^ . • ^ 
for would it comport with the general purpose of the ordinance. 
This is the specific finding that Boards must make in order to 
justify denial of a variance request.
 vIt_is^ .therefore. clear that 
the^action of the Boardcarmot_befound arbitrary and^caprici^us^ 
or contrary to law. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL J C ^ i g C N G S — - ^ ^ 
^—
= = 10rT^1analyses r e g a r d i n g t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r t h e B o a r d ' s 
d e n i a l of p l a i n t i f f ' s r e q u e s t f o r a v a r i a n c e i s a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
t a k i n g s must b e g i n w i t h t h e P a l a z z o l o d e c i s i o n . At t h e t i m e t h e 
c a s e was f i r s t b r o u g h t t o t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s , t h e o n l y 
i s s u e which a p p e a r e d t o c o n c e r n them r e g a r d e d w h e t h e r a p r o p e r t y 
owner i n p l a i n t i f f ' s p o s i t i o n , (one a c q u i r i n g o w n e r s h i p a f t e r a 
r e s t r i c t i v e o r d i n a n c e i s p a s s e d ) , had s t a n d i n g t o m a i n t a i n a 
t a k i n g s c l a i m a g a i n s t t h e gove rnmen t . However, of e q u a l i m p o r t a n c e 
i s t h e Supreme C o u r t ' s t r e a t m e n t of w h e t h e r a p r o p e r t y - u s e 
r e g u l a t o r y b o a r d ' s d e c i s i o n was f i n a l f o r p u r p o s e s of t a k i n g s 
a n a l y s i s . I n o t h e r words , t h e a c t i o n of t h e b o a r d must be 
s u f f i c i e n t l y f i n a l and d e f i n i t e t o s u p p o r t a f u l l y r i p e t a k i n g s 
c l a i m . 
Ripeness 1 
I n P a l a z z o l o , t h e S t a t e of Rhode I s l a n d c l a i m e d t h a t b e c a u s e 
t h e r e were any number of o t h e r u s e s t o which t h e p l a i n t i f f c o u l d 
p u t h i s l a n d , t h e a c t i o n of t h e s t a t e i n d e n y i n g h i s r e q u e s t f o r a 
More than one l o c a t i o n in the record r e f e r s to t h i s ac t i on as a f a c i a l 
cha l lenge to the s lope ordinance, which as s t a t e d in Smith Investment Co. v. 
Sandy City , 958 P.2d 245 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), does not r e q u i r e a r i peness 
i nqu i ry . However, i t appears to the Court t h a t the c e n t r a l premise of the 
County's argument regard ing p l a i n t i f f ' s fu tu re a b i l i t y to ob ta in a var iance i s 
e s s e n t i a l l y a r i penes s argument. Because the procedure p r e sc r ibed in the 
zoning ordinances al lows for var iances to the ord inance , t h i s i s an "as 
appl ied" chal lenge. 
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variance for the specific purpose stated in the variance request 
could not constitute a ripe takings claim. The state's theory was 
that some future request to use the land for some other purpose 
than the one stated in his application, may result in the granting 
of the variance as requested. The Supreme Court rejected this 
proposition because it was clear that in that case, the decision 
handed down by the state Board precluded any other economically 
viable use for the land. Essentially, the restriction went to the 
nature of the land which the plaintiff owned, and not to any 
particular use which he proposed.2 
The Supreme Court states: 
Under our ripeness rules, a takings claim 
based on a law or regulation which is alleged 
to go too far in burdening property depends 
upon the landowner's first having followed 
reasonable and necessary steps to allow 
regulatory agencies to exercise their full 
discretion in considering development plans 
for the property, including the opportunity to 
grant any variances or waivers allowed by law. 
As a general rule, until these ordinary 
processes have been followed the extent of the 
restriction on property is not known and a 
regulatory taking has not yet been 
established. 
Id. 533 U.S. 606 at 620-621. 
The plaintiff in that case wanted to fill portions of the marshy, 
coastal wetland he owned so he could build a beach resort. Without being able 
to fill the land, the plaintiff would not be able to put most of the land to 
any use. 
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In this case, if the County's contention is true--that the 
plaintiff had merely not presented a petition for variance upon 
which the County could act--then it follows that the County's 
denial of this variance does not, without more, show the extent of 
the restriction on property. However, the language which the 
County chose provides at least colloquial support for a contention 
that the decision precludes any building upon the lot, and hence, 
deprivation of any economic value in the land: 
Construction of a home on steep slopes, such 
as on the Arnell lot, presents a host of other 
problems and dangers that cannot be readily 
anticipated or mitigated, including the threat 
of slope instability, foundation slippage, 
soil erosion, avalanche, fire, landslide, 
falling trees and boulders, retaining wall 
failure, and aesthetic impacts, not to mention 
off-site impacts such as septic and irrigation 
runoff. 
While engineers can technically design 
structures on steeper slopes, the 30% slope 
limitation reflects nationwide standards that 
balance protection of property rights with 
protection of health, safety, and welfare of 
the property owner, adjoining property owners, 
and the general public. Regulation of home 
building on mountainous slopes is a common, 
necessary, and proper exercise of police power 
that increases overall safety and value in 
property. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 5, ^[5-6. This 
decision by the Board of Commissioners, after receiving the data 
which the Board of Adjustment found lacking in the initial request 
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for variance (the findings acknowledge receipt of "unsatisfactory 
site-specific geotechnical data, evidence of water and sewer 
access, and related structural design." Id. at 3, % 7 (emphasis in 
original)), states in absolute terms what the Board of Adjustment 
was initially only prepared to state conditionally. The Board 
concludes: 
The effect of granting an exception to, or 
compensating Arnell might be that the County 
is obligated to grant similar relief to other 
lot owners similarly situated in existing and 
future subdivisions, effectively rescinding 
residential building restrictions on slopes 
that have been accepted by property owners and 
developers and enforced in the County for well 
for [sic] over 25 years. Granting an 
exception would defeat the purpose of the 
Wasatch Canyon Master Plan and FCOZ and would 
result in manifest injustice to those who have 
complied in the past and will do so in the 
future. 
Id. at 5-6 f7. This language does not demonstrate the County 
lacked any opportunity to consider the plans for the site, or that 
"the extent of the restriction upon the property is not known". 
However, the failure to provide a report of the actual soils on 
the site in a form that was sufficient for the County to act 
knowledgeably upon the request makes it impossible for the County 
to determine whether the requirements for granting a variance have 
been met. The case, therefore, is not necessarily ripe. Variance 
requests regarding the FCOZ zoning ordinance have been, and will 
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likely continue to be, granted upon the satisfaction of the Board 
that the requirements for variance are met. However, because this 
conclusion is based upon information which can be used to support 
either conclusion, the Court considers, for argument's sake, that 
plaintiff's takings claim was ripe. 
Standing 
After reading Palazzolo, the hearing officer recommended that 
the takings claim should not be denied based upon a lack of 
standing.. The Court agrees that Palazzolo requires that outcome. 
The factors ultimately rejected by the High Court, which 
supported the Rhode Island Supreme Court's determination, "amount 
to a single, sweeping rule: A purchaser or a successive title 
holder like petitioner is deemed to have notice of an earlier-
enacted restriction and is barred from claiming that it effects a 
taking." The Supreme Court continued, and determined that if Rhode 
Island's suggestion were the rule, 
the postenactment transfer of title would 
absolve the State of its obligation to defend 
any action restricting land use, no matter how 
extreme or unreasonable. A State would be 
allowed, in effect, to put an expiration date 
on the Takings Clause. This ought not to be 
the rule. Future generations, too, have a 
right to challenge unreasonable limitations on 
the use and value of land. 
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Accordingly, plaintiff is not denied standing merely because he 
purchased the property after enactment of the FCOZ or its 
predecessors. 
Application of Penn Central 
The petitioners in Penn Central sought relief from a 
historical landmarks statute which singled out some 4 00 of the more 
than one million buildings in New York City (see, id. at 138-139 
(Rehnquist, dissenting)), and which as applied to the petitioners, 
restricted their ability to build on top of the existing Grand 
Central Terminal, which they owned. In holding that so restricting 
the use of the valuable vertical air-space above the terminal did 
not constitute a taking, the Supreme Court held that because the 
terminal itself constituted a valuable economic use of the parcel, 
it could not be said that the lot had been deprived of all economic 
value. The Court refused the suggestion of the petitioners that 
the existing landmark should be considered separately from the 
airspace above the property. 
A "Penn Central1' analysis is intensely fact-specific. This 
has been recognized by the parties to this action, and by the 
Supreme Court of this State. The Court stated it this way: 
[W] e have frequently observed that whether a 
particular restriction will be rendered 
invalid by the government's failure to pay for 
any losses proximately caused by it depends 
largely upon the particular circumstances in 
ARNELL V. S. L. COUNTY 
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT PAGE 14 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
that case. 
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, 
factual inquiries, the Court?s decisions have 
identified several factors that have 
particular significance. The economic impact 
of the regulation on the claimant and, 
particularly, the extent to which the 
regulation has interfered with distinct 
investment-backed expectations are, of course, 
relevant considerations. So, too, is the 
character of the governmental action. A 
"taking" may more readily be found when the 
interference with property can be 
characterized as a physical invasion by 
government, see, e. g., United States v. 
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), than when 
interference arises from some public program 
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic 
life to promote the common good. 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 
(1978) (internal citations omitted). No one interested in this 
matter disputes that if the plaintiff is prohibited from making any 
development at all, the economic impact upon the plaintiff would be 
significant, nor that plaintiff purchased the property with the 
expectation that he could build his canyon home thereon. Not 
unlike in Penn Central, the character of the governmental action is 
not a physical invasion of the plaintiff's property, but one 
distinction here is that the statute in question has applicability 
to many lots in the area where plaintiff's property is situated, 
instead of the mere 400 properties out of more than one million. 
Another difference is that the ordinance in question here is not a 
blanket prohibition placing the burden of public benefit on the 
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shoulders of so few, but rather, is a conditional prohibition which 
affects every person who owns property which is above a certain 
percentage of slope. These differences, including that this zoning 
statute includes provisions for the safety of the public as well as 
the aesthetical reasons, weigh against finding a takings here. 
The primary difficulty with the manner in which this case is 
presented on appeal is determining whether there is any room in the 
rather broadly preclusive language in the findings and conclusions 
of the Board of County Commissioners to find, as the County urges, 
that not all economic use, as in Penn Central, has been precluded. 
If the Court were to rely only upon the data in the record 
excepting therefrom the findings and conclusions, its determination 
of this matter would be simple. The record clearly supports that 
plaintiff was provided multiple opportunities to provide 
information sufficient for the County to make its decision, but 
failed to do so. This parcel is on a steep slope. It is clearly 
not unreasonable for the County to have less than complete 
confidence in, or refuse to rely solely upon, the opinion of the 
landowner, or even his architect, that it is safe to build, without 
more. The Court agrees with the statement at the end of the 
conclusions of law that state 
Regulation of home building on mountainous 
slopes is a common, necessary, and proper 
exercise of the police power that increases 
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overall safety and value in property. 
. . .Granting an exception would defeat 
the purpose of the Wasatch Canyon Master Plan 
and the FCOZ and would result in manifest 
injustice to those who have complied in the 
past and will do so in the future. 
Id. at pp.5-6. Regardless of the difficulty, the Court must 
consider the language of the decision, and must, if possible, read 
that decision consistent with the proceedings upon which it is 
based. To that end, there are portions of the decision that speak 
to the analysis required under Penn Central. Among the reasons for 
denying the plaintiff's takings petition which relate to the slope 
ordinance, are a couple of points which would prevent plaintiff 
from putting his property to the beneficial use he desires 
regardless if the County had granted his requested variance. In 
Paragraph 3 of the Conclusions of Law, the County stated that 
Due to absorption limitations on steep slopes, 
state and local health authorities preclude 
construction of sewer drain fields on steep 
slopes. Arnell has stated that he can connect 
to a sewer but has not demonstrated that he 
has, or can obtain, legal access across other 
private properties to a sewer line some 800 
feet downhill in Big Cottonwood Canyon. Until 
such time as Forest Glen subdivision is put on 
sewer, development on steep lots may be 
unfeasible. 
According to this statement, it is not clear that the plaintiff is 
being denied use of his land by operation of the slope ordinance 
because even if the variance had been granted, it may be the lack 
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of adequate sewer accommodations that in the end results in the 
prohibition against building, or the lack of adequate water supply 
(see Conclusions at para. 4) . 
Because the plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the ordinance in 
question is depriving him of any economically viable use for the 
property, there has been no takings under Penn Central. 
PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT MADSEN'S CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff asserts three claims against defendant Madsen: (1) 
breach of warrant deed; (2) breach of implied warranty of 
habitability; and (3) rescission based upon mutual mistake. All 
three claims are without merit and can be disposed of summarily. 
There can be no breach of warranty deed under the undisputed facts 
of this case because the warranty deed at issue failed to contain 
a covenant warranty against government building restrictions. 
Furthermore, a government building restriction is not an 
"encumbrance" and purchasers of land must take notice of public 
statutes restricting the use of granted premises. Utah does not 
recognize a claim for breach of an implied warranty of habitability 
in real property sales. (Snowflower, 31 P.3d 576.) There is no 
mutual mistake concerning an "existing fact." The County's refusal 
to grant a variance was a future act not an exiting fact and 
plaintiff's knowledge of the law in the form of the County's slope 
ordinance is presumed. Based upon the foregoing, plaintiff's 
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Motion for Summary Judgment against defendant Madsen is denied and 
Madsen's cross Motion is granted. Defendant Madsen's Motion or 
Summary Judgment against Salt Lake County is now moot. 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED. Salt Lake County's Motion is 
GRANTED, and Madsen's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in 
part (dismissing plaintiff's requested relief from Madsen), and 
DENIED in part as moot (Madsen1.s request that the County be 
required to indemnify him as to any damages he is required to pay 
to plaintiff). 
This constitutes the final order of the Court on the matters 
referenced herein. No further Order is required. 
Dated this C?-\ day of April, 2004. 
tYRONE E. MEDLEY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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19.93.010 Purpose 
The purpose of this chapter is to establish procedures for: 
A. obtaining and analyzing information regarding a claim that the application or 
enforcement of Salt Lake County zoning ordinances and / or land use 
regulations to private property within the unincorporated areas of the County 
constitutes an unconstitutional taking of private property without just 
compensation; and 
B. determining whether it might be appropriate to grant administrative relief to 
the claimant in the event it is determined that such application or enforcement 
constitutes an unconstitutional taking, 
19.93.020 Findings 
The Governing Body makes the following findings: 
A. To further the public interest in lawful and responsible land development, and 
promote the health, welfare, and safety of its residents, the County has 
enacted zoning and other land development regulations applicable to 
properties within unincorporated areas of the County, including new and 
revised regulations applicable to properties in the county's canyons and 
foothills; and 
B. In the event an owner of private property within the unincorporated area of 
the County claims that the application or enforcement of County zoning 
ordinances or other land use regulation constitutes an unconstitutional taking 
of its private property, it is in the best interests of the County to have 
established procedures for obtaining relevant information for analyzing such 
claim and determining whether it might be appropriate to grant certain relief to 
the claimant, rather than conducting such analysis in a more confrontational, 
expensive, and time-consuming litigation context 
19.93.030 Taking Relief Procedures: 
Petition & Submittal Requirements 
A. Takings Relief Petition 
Any applicant, after a final decision on its application is rendered by the Planning and 
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Development Services Director, Planning Commission, Board of Adjustment, or 
Governing Body, may file a Takings Relief Petition with the Planning and Development 
Services Director seeking relief from the final decision on the grounds that it constitutes 
an unconstitutional taking of the applicant's private property. 
B. Affected Property Interest 
The Takings Relief Petition must provide information sufficient for the District 
Attorney to determine that the petitioner possesses a protectable interest in 
property under Article I, Section 22 of the Constitution of Utah or the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the event the Petition does 
not provide information sufficient for the District Attorney to determine that the 
petitioner possesses a protectable interest in property under Article I, Section 
22 of the Constitution of Utah or the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, the Petition shall be returned to the petitioner. 
C. Time for Filing Petition 
No later than thirty (30) calendar days from the final decision by the 
Development Services Director, Planning Commission, Board of Adjustment, 
Governing Body, or other County review authority on any site plan or other 
type of zoning application the applicant shall file a Takings Relief Petition with 
the Development Services Director. 
D. Information to Be Submitted with Takings Relief Petition 
1. The Takings Relief Petition must be submitted on a form prepared 
by the Development Services Director, and must be accompanied at a 
minimum by the following information: 
a. The name of the petitioner; 
b. The name and business address of the current owner of the 
property; form of ownership, (whether sole proprietorship, for-
profit or not-for-profit corporation, partnership, joint venture, 
limited liability company, or other); and if owned by corporation, 
partnership, or joint venture, or limited liability company, the 
names and addresses of principal shareholders or partners or 
members; 
c. The price paid and other terms of sale for the property, the date 
of purchase, and the name of the party from whom purchased. 
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Include the relationship, if any, between the petitioner and the 
party from whom the property was acquired; 
d. The nature of the protectable interest claimed to be affected, 
such as, but not limited to, fee simple ownership or leasehold 
interest; 
e. The terms (including sale price) of any previous purchase or 
sale of a full or partial interest in the property by the current 
owner, applicant, or developer prior to the date of application; 
f. All appraisals of the property prepared for any purpose, include 
financing, offering for sale, or ad valorem taxation, within the 
three years prior to the date of the Petition; 
g. The assessed value of and ad valorem taxes on the property for 
the three years prior to the date of the Petition; 
h. All information concerning current mortgages or other loans 
secured by the property, including name of the mortgagee or 
lender, current interest rate, remaining loan balance, and term 
of the loan and other significant provisions, including but not 
limited to, right of purchase to assume the loan; 
i. All listings of the property for sale or rent, price asked and offers 
received, (if any), during the period of ownership or interest in 
the property; 
j . All studies commissioned by the petitioner or agents of the 
petitioner within the previous three years concerning feasibility 
of development or utilization of the property; 
k. For income producing property, itemized income and expense 
statements from the property for the previous three years; 
I. Evidence and documentation of improvements, investments, 
and expenditures for professional and other services related to 
property made during the past three years; 
m. Information from a title policy or other source showing all 
recorded liens or encumbrances affecting the property; and 
n. Information describing all use(s) of the property during the five 
years prior to the Petition. 
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2. The Planning and Development Services Director may request 
additional information reasonably necessary, in his or her opinion, to 
arrive at a conclusion concerning whether there has been a taking. 
E. Failure to Submit Information 
In the event that any of the information required to be submitted by the 
petitioner is not reasonably available, the petitioner shall file with the Petition 
a statement of the information that cannot be obtained and shall describe the 
reasons why such information is unavailable. 
19.93.040 Taking Relief Procedures: 
Determination of Taking 
A. Preliminary Determination of Taking 
1. Prior to the appointment of a Hearing Officer, and based on a review of 
the Petition and all relevant information submitted by the petitioner, the 
Governing Body, upon advice of the Development Services Director 
and the District Attorney, shall make a preliminary determination 
whether a taking may have occurred. This preliminary determination 
shall be made within thirty (30) days of the filing of the Petition and 
submission of all information required to make such determination. In 
the event the Governing Body makes a preliminary determination that 
a taking may have occurred, the Governing Body may appoint a 
Hearing Officer, elect to conduct either formal or informal 
administrative proceedings, and proceed with a full review of the 
Petition. 
2. If a preliminary determination is made that a taking may have 
occurred, then the Development Services Director and District Attorney 
shall recommend whether the hearing shall be formal or informal under 
the Rules of Procedure adopted by the Governing Body for such 
hearings. 
3. If upon the advice of the Development Services Director and the 
District Attorney, the Governing Body finds that a taking has not 
occurred, the Petition shall be denied and no Hearing Officer shall be 
appointed. 
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Appointment of Hearing Officer 
The Planning and Development Services Director shall, within thirty (30) days 
following a preliminary determination by the Governing Body that a taking 
may have occurred, appoint a Hearing Officer to review information by the 
petitioner, to hold a public hearing to determine whether a taking has 
occurred, and to make a recommendation to the Governing Body concerning 
the Petition. 
Qualifications of the Hearing Officer 
Every appointed Hearing Officer shall be licensed to practice law in the state 
of Utah. Prior to appointment, the Hearing Officer shall submit a statement of 
no potential or actual conflict of interest in connection with the Petitioner or 
Petition. 
Notice of Public Hearing 
Within ten (10) days following appointment of the Hearing Officer, written 
notice of a public hearing shall be published and posted in accordance with 
Section 19.84.040.D. of this Title. The hearing shall be held within thirty (30) 
days of the final date of written notice, unless a reasonable extension of time 
is agreed to by both the Development Services Director and the Petitioner. 
Conduct of the Hearing 
The hearing shall be conducted according to the requirements of the Rules of 
Procedure adopted by the Governing Body for such hearings. 
Determining the Takings Issue 
The Hearing Officer shall consider, among other items, the following 
information or evidence: 
1. Any estimates from contractors, appraisers, architects, real estate 
analysts, qualified developers, or other competent and qualified real 
estate professionals concerning the feasibility, or lack of feasibility, of 
construction or development on the property as of the date of the 
Petition, and in the reasonably near future; 
2. Any evidence or testimony of the market value of the property both 
under the uses allowed by the existing regulations and any proposed 
use; and, 
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3. Any evidence or testimony concerning the value or benefit to the 
petitioner from the availability of opportunities to cluster development 
on other remaining contiguous property owned by the petitioner 
eligible for such clustering as provided elsewhere in Title 19. 
Burden of Proof 
The petitioner shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the final decision that is the subject of the Takings Relief 
Petition constitutes an unconstitutional taking. 
Findings of the Hearing Officer 
The Hearing Officer shall, on the basis of the evidence and testimony 
presented, make the following specific findings as part of his/her report and 
recommendations to the Governing Body: 
1. Whether the petitioner has complied with the requirements for 
presenting the information to be submitted with a Takings Relief 
Petition; 
2. Whether the petitioner has a protectable interest in the property that is 
the subject of the Petition; 
3. The market value of the property considering the existing zoning 
regulation. 
4. The market value of the property under the proposed use; 
5. Whether there are other economically viable uses that may be made of 
the property; 
6. The market value of, or benefit accruing from opportunities to cluster 
development on other remaining contiguous property owned by the 
petitioner eligible for such transfer as provided for in Title 19 of the Salt 
Lake County Code of Ordinances. 
7. Whether it was feasible to undertake construction on, or development 
of, the property as of the date of the application, or in the reasonably 
near future thereafter; 
Whether the final decision that is the subject of the Takings Relief Petition 
constitutes an unconstitutional taking of private property without just 
compensation. 
I. Report and Recommendations of the Hearing Officer 
1. If the Hearing Officer finds that the final decision which is the subject of 
the Takings Relief Petition constitutes an unconstitutional taking of 
private property without just compensation, he or she shall remand the 
matter to the Governing Body with recommendations concerning what 
relief might be appropriate. In making such recommendations, the 
Hearing Officer shall consider, among other factors: 
a. Approval of development on some portion of the property; or; 
b. A rezoning of the property to a more appropriate classification, 
approval of an alternative development plan, modification or 
waiver of normally-applicable development standards, or other 
appropriate land-use regulatory action; 
c. An opportunity to cluster development; 
d. For property subject to the Foothills and Canyons Overlay 
Zone, transfer of up to ten (10) percent of the maximum 
allowable density that would otherwise be attributable to areas 
with greater than thirty (30) percent slope on the subject 
property to other developable portions of the property; 
e. A waiver of permit fees; 
f. Acquisition of all or a portion of the property at market value. 
2. Recommendations for clustering within the boundaries of the subject 
property owned by the petitioner shall require a written finding by the 
Hearing Officer that such clustering and the resulting increase in 
development density will be compatible with existing developments 
and land use patterns on properties surrounding the subject property. 
a. For purposes of such "compatibility" finding, the Hearing Officer 
shall compare the petitioner's proposed development 
incorporating the increased transfer density with existing 
development on surrounding properties, and take into 
consideration the following factors: 
(1) Architectural character; 
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(2) Building size, height, bulk, mass, and scale; 
(3) Building orientation; 
(4) Privacy considerations in terms of privacy for prospective 
residents within the petitioner's development and in 
terms of privacy protection for adjoining land uses; 
(5) Building materials; 
(6) Building color; and 
(7) When applicable, operations of the petitioner's 
development project, including but not limited to hours of 
operation; activities that may generate adverse impacts 
on adjacent land uses such as noise or glare; location of 
loading/delivery zones; and light intensity and hours of 
full illumination. 
b. The report and recommendation shall be submitted to the 
Governing Body and mailed to the petitioner within thirty (30) 
days following the conclusion of the public hearing. 
J. Governing Body Review and Consideration 
1. The Governing Body shall review the report and recommendations of 
the Hearing Officer and approve or deny the Takings Relief Petition 
within sixty (60) days following receipt of the Hearing Officer's report. 
Provided, however, that the Governing Body may extend this period 
upon a finding that due to the size and complexity of the development 
or proposal and similar factors that additional review time is necessary. 
2. The Governing Body may hold a public hearing and provide notice as 
set forth in Section 19.84.040.D. of this Title. Only new testimony and 
evidence shall be presented at any such public hearing. 
3. The Governing Body may adopt any legally available incentive or 
measure reasonably necessary to offset the taking, and may condition 
such incentives upon approval of specific development or site plans. 
4. The decision of the Governing Body shall not become final until it 
issues a decision approving or denying the Petition and specifying any 
relief it may deem appropriate. 
o 
Time Limits / Transferral of Relief or Incentives 
Any relief or incentives adopted by the Governing Body pursuant to this 
chapter may be transferred and utilized by successive owners of the property 
or parties in interest, but in no case shall the relief incentives be valid after 
the expiration date of a specific development approval. 
ADDENDUM NO. 3 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
— 00000— 
In the Matter of a Takings Petition 
Under Chapter 19.93 of the 
County Ordinances 
Filed by: 
Jason P. Arnell FINDINGS OF FACT, 
3441 South 2200 West CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, and 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 RECOMMENDED DECISION 
Location of Property Alleged 
to be Taken: 
Lot 13, Forest Glen Plat "B" 
Salt Lake County 
— 0 0 0 0 0 — 
Procedural History 
Preliminary Determination of a Possible Taking 
Following the County's denial of a discretionary variance to allow construction on his 
property, Jason P. Arnell ("Petitioner") filed a Takings Petition under new Chapter 19-93. On March 28, 
2000, in response to the Takings Petition, the Board of County Commissioners made a finding of possible 
taking with respect to Petitioner's property in the Forest Glen subdivision in Big Cottonwood Canyon 
(sometimes referred to as the "subject property"). This finding triggered the application of the hearing 
procedures of Chapter 19-93. The undersigned was retained as independent hearing officer to conduct the 
required hearing. 
First Hearing and Determining of Hearing Procedures Under Chapter 19-93 
On April 26, 2000 this matter first came before the undersigned for hearing pursuant to 
written notice. Representatives of the County were present, including legal counsel for the County. 
Petitioner was also present, and was represented by his legal counsel. Mr. William Gordon, a soil engineer, 
and Mr. Troy McOmber, a licensed architect, also appeared for Petitioner. After an initial presentation by 
Petitioner, the parties discussed with the Hearing Officer concerning the procedures to be followed in a 
Chapter 19-93 hearing. After both sides were heard on the matter, the hearing officer ruled preliminarily and 
procedurally as follows: 
1. The Hearing Officer must make findings of fact concerning each of the 7 factors 
listed in subpart H, as well as making a finding on the ultimate issue: whether a legal 
taking of property without just compensation has taken place. In doing so, the Hearing 
Officer can receive the types of evidence contemplated in subpart F. As to each item of 
subpart H, the Petitioner has the burden of proof as provided in subpart G. 
2. If as a result of the findings called for in subpart H, the Hearing Officer finds that 
a taking of Petitioner's property by the County without just compensation has or 
occurred, the Hearing Officer must proceed to make a recommended resolution of the 
taking as provided in subpart L If no taking is found under subpart H, no action is 
required under subpart I. 
3. Because Petitioner has the burden of proof, Petitioner is entitled to a fair 
opportunity to present expert and factual evidence, and to have the County do the same as 
it chooses. To accomplish this, a procedure for introducing evidence with intervening 
time for preparation of countervailing evidence was established as follows, and so 
communicated to the parties: 
(a) On or before June 30, 2000, Petitioner shall prepare and deliver to 
the County and to the Hearing Officer written testimony from Petitioner 
and such expert and factual witnesses as Petitioner may retain relative to 
the issues of subpart H Such written testimony may be in the form of 
questions and answers or in summary opinion form. Petitioner, having 
the burden of proof and of persuasion, is in the best position to set the 
scope of the evidence by being first to file, 
(b) On or before July 25, 2000, the County shall prepare and deliver 
to Petitioner and to the Hearing Officer written testimony from such 
expert and factual witnesses as the County may retain relative to the 
issues of subpart H and in response to thepre-filed testimony of 
Petitioner's witnesses. 
(c) On or before August 18, 2000, Petitioner may prepare and deliver 
to the County and to the Hearing Officer written testimony from Petitioner 
and such expert and factual witnesses as Petitioner may retain in rebuttal 
to the pre-filed testimony of the County. This will not be a second 
opportunity to embellish Petitioner's case, but solely to rebut factual or 
expert testimony of the County. 
(d) On August 28, 2000 at 9:00 AM in Room N3500 at the County 
Complex, the Hearing Officer will convene a hearing to allow the County 
to cross-examine the Petitioner fs witnesses and to allow Petitioner to 
cross-examine the County's witnesses. All persons whose testimony was 
prefiledfor either side will be expected to be present at this hearing unless 
excused by prearrangement. Also at this hearing the parties will each be 
allowed to make a summary argument at the conclusion of the evidence 
taking and cross-examination. Such summary argument will go to the 
issues of subpart H and also to the issues of subpart I, as appropriate. 
4. Items 1 and 2 of subpart H were stipulated by Petitioner and the County to be found in 
favor of Petitioner. It was also stipulated by the parties that item 6 of subpart H was inapplicable to this 
case, and thus could be deemed found in favor of Petitioner. 
The Second Hearing 
5. As and when called for under the procedures established at the First Hearing, the 
following witnesses prefiled written testimony1 for Petitioner: 
(a) Troy McOmber, architect 
(b) William Gordon, soil engineer 
(c) Jason Arnell, Petitioner 
The following witnesses timely prefiled tesimony2 for the County: 
(a) Calvin Schneller, Director of Planning and Development Services for the County 
(b) Darlene Batatian, geologist 
Rebuttal testimony3 was prefiled by Petitioner timely. 
Petitioner also proffered the testimony of George Hansen, P.E. as contained in a letter from Mr. Hansen submitted in 
connection with Petitioner's request for a zoning variance from the County. The undersigned accepts the testimony of Mr. Hansen 
contained in his letter as evidence and part of the record. The quality of Mr. Hansen's testimony does not depart from that of the 
other witnesses for the parties. 
Both in offering the letter from Mr. Hansen (who also did not do property specific testing) and in the prefiled testimony of his 
experts, Petitioner chose to offer summary conclusion testimony rather than test-supported detailed testimony. As highlighted in 
cross examination, none of Petitioner's experts did property specific testing or design work to support their conclusions. However, 
the County failed to offer opinion evidence based on property specific studies to contradict the summary conclusions of Petitioner 
and his experts. Therefore the even quality of the evidence on both sides negates the impact of the lack of actual architectural 
designs and soils and other tests on the subject property by Petitioner's witnesses. Whether detailed architectural designs and site 
specific soils and engineering testimony ought to be required in Chapter 19-93 hearings is left to the Board of County 
Commissioners or a future hearing officer to decide in another case. 
None of the testimony or other submissions of Petitioner or his witnesses dealt with the ultimate issue of whether a government 
taking without just compensation took place. Legal argument with respect to this issue was advanced in the Takings Petition. The 
undersigned has accepted the reviewed such legal argument as part of the record in this proceeding. 
2
 Ms. Batatian offered summary testimony of the same quality as Petitioner's experts, but did not contradict the conclusions 
reached by the Petitioner's experts. Mr. Schneller offered an argument position paper not directly disputing any conclusions of 
Petitioner's experts. Whether detailed architectural design criticism and site specific soils and engineering testimony ought to be 
required of the County in Chapter 19-93 hearings is left to the Board of County Commissioners or a future hearing officer to 
decide in a future case. 
None of the testimony or other submissions of the County or its witnesses dealt with the ultimate issue of whether a government 
taking without just compensation took place. Oral testimony concerning the existence and timing of the adoption of the current 
zoning ordinance, as well as scant references to the former zoning ordinances, was summarily offered at the first hearing, but not 
followed up in the pre-filed testimony nor at the second hearing save in response to a question by the undersigned. The County 
never introduced into the record copies of the current zoning ordinance or the prior zoning ordinance. 
In response to a question from the undersigned, the County testified at the second hearing that the prior zoning ordinance also 
provided a prohibition against building on a 30% or greater slope angle. 
Petitioner's rebuttal testimony was a legal counsel summary of the evidence and argument. No new evidence was offered. 
6. On August 28, 2000, a second hearing was convened by the undersigned in Room 
N3500 at the County Complex. The pre-filed testimony of all parties and witnesses was received into 
evidence. Legal counsel for the County cross-examined Mr. Gordon, Mr. McOmber and Petitioner. Legal 
counsel for Petitioner chose not to cross-examine the County witnesses. Closing arguments were made by 
legal counsel for both parties. 
Having heard the evidence and arguments, reviewed the applicable law, and otherwise being 
folly advised and informed in this matter, the Hearing Examiner hereby submits the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
7. The County has adopted and maintained zoning ordinances since sometime in the 
1980's restricting and prohibiting development on property in Big Cottonwood Canyon having a slope angle 
of 30% or greater, an angle determined by the County to be dangerous for construction of structures, given 
the potential slide and runoff impacts on surrounding property owners. 
8. The County adopted the current zoning ordinance on August 15, 1997, and it 
expressly prohibits construction of a residence on the subject property because of its 30% or greater slope 
angle. 
9. Petitioner purchased the subject property on May 4, 1999, nearly two years after the 
current zoning ordinance was effective, and several years after the prior zoning ordinance effectively 
prohibited construction on the subject property. The subject property has an approximately 50% slope angle, 
although the specific angle varies along the topography of the subject property. 
10. In connection with his purchase of the subject property, Petitioner undertook no 
examination of the applicable zoning ordinances or other County requirements applicable to the subject 
property. Petitioner observed the residences then existing on nearby lots in the same subdivision4 and 
assumed that he could also build a similar residence on the subject property. 
11. Shortly after purchasing the subject property in 1999, Petitioner retained Mr. 
McOmber to design a residence for the subject property. Petitioner was informed by Mr. McOmber 
concerning the current zoning ordinance and its prohibition of construction on the subject property based on 
its 30% or greater slope angles. 
12. Petitioner's property is substantially at or above a 30% slope angle. 
The subject property is a lot in the Forest Glen subdivision. This subdivision was approved by the County long before zoning 
ordinances prohibited construction on a 30% or greater slope, and long before Petitioner acquired the subject property. Petitioner 
argues that the current zoning ordinance (and by implication the immediately prior zoning ordinance with a similar prohibition 
based on the slope) are illegal modifications of the approved Forest Glen subdivision in violation of Section 17-27-810 UCA and 
the holding in Wood v. North Salt Lake, 390 P.2d 858 (1964). The hearing called for in Chapter 19-93 is to make findings as to 
specific issues, and to recommend remedial action if an unconstitutional taking by the County has occurred. Chapter 19-93 does 
not provide a forum for an appeal or general review of, or challenge to, the current zoning ordinance. I take the current zoning 
ordinance as a legal and valid given in determining the existence of an unconstitutional taking under Chapter 19-93. Petitioner is 
free to challenge the current zoning ordinances under Section 17-27-810 UCA and/or Wood in another forum, if such an action is 
now timely. Such issues are irrelevant to the present proceeding under Chapter 19-93. 
13. Petitioner sought, and the County denied a variance based on the current zoning 
ordinance and its prohibition of construction in Big Cottonwood Canyon on property having a 30% or 
greater slope angle. 
14*. Petitioner has complied with the requirements for presenting the information to be 
submitted with a Takings Relief Petition under Chapter 19-93.2. 
15*. Petitioner is the owner of the subject property, and thus has a protectable interest in 
the subject property. (But see conclusions of law, below, as to Petitioner's standing to make a takings 
claim.) 
16. The market value of the subject property, considering the existing zoning regulation, 
is substantially $05. 
17. The market value of the subject property under the proposed use, without regard to the 
current zoning ordinance, is $95,000, based on the recently negotiated price paid by Petitioner, and his 
testimony concerning other recent sales of other lots in the Forest Glen subdivision. 
18*. Given the application of the current zoning ordinance, there are no economically 
viable uses of the subject property. 
19. There is no cluster development opportunity for the subject property as contemplated 
in H.6. of Chapter 19-93. 
20. It is feasible, from an architectural, engineering and soils standpoint, for Petitioner to 
construct a residence on the subject property, without regard to the current zoning ordinance. The 
undersigned is making no finding concerning the economic feasibility of such construction, inasmuch as no 
evidence was provided by any party as to the cost of creating the type of structure required to meet the 
feasibility requirements of the architect, the structural engineer and the soils engineer.6 
* These paragraphs make "findings" that are partly factual findings and partly legal conclusions. They are made here as 
"findings" required by Chapter 19-93. 
The subject property has a value greater than $0, although that value is impossible to ascertain in the absence of expert 
testimony or actual offers from willing buyers. Certainly the value of the subject property is severely reduced as a result of the 
zoning ordinance. I do note that "[mjere diminution in value is insufficient to meet the burden of demonstrating a taking by 
regulation." Cornish Town v. Koller, 817 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1991). As the U.S. Supreme Court has declared, "'Government 
hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in 
the general law m Perm Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S. Ct. at 2659 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 
U.S. 393,413, 43 S. Ct. 158, 159, 67 L. Ed. 322 (1922)). Indeed, regulations causing significant diminution in value been upheld 
against takings challenges. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384, 47 S. Ct. 114, 117, 71 L. Ed. 303 
(1926) (75% diminution in value); Hadacheck v. Sebastian. 239 U.S. 394, 394, 36 S. Ct. 143, 143, 60 L. Ed. 348 (1915) (92.5% 
diminution); Pace Resources, Inc. v. Shrewsbury Township, 808 F.2d 1023, 1031 (3d Cir. 1987) (89.5%); William C. Haas & Co. 
v. City of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 1979) (95%); Sierra Terreno v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 79 Cal. 
App. 3d 439, 144 Cal. Rptr. 776, 777 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (81%). For this reason I have made a finding of no value under the 
current application of the zoning ordinance in order to avoid the effect of arguing about how little of the property must remain 
before a partial taking is transformed into a full taking. 
Petitioner's witnesses exhibited an unabashed "can do" attitude toward the ability to design a residence structure safely and 
securely on the subject property, and to install the types of sewage system required. No consideration was given or testimony 
offered as to the cost of the "feasibility". 
CONCLUSIONS OF LA W 
21. The Takings Clause of the United States Constitution, which applies to the states (and 
the County) through the Fourteenth Amendment, declares: "Nor shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation." U.S. Const, amend. V. 
22. The Utah Constitution, Sec. 22 [Private property for public use], similarly provides 
that "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." 
23. These constitutional requirements' primary purpose is mto bar Government from 
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the 
public as a whole."' Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384, 114 S. Ct. 2309,2316,129 L. Ed. 2d 304 
(1994). 
24. Petitioner makes what is called a "facial" attack on the current zoning ordinance. In 
other words, the existence of the ordinance itself has the effect of a taking, rather than the way the ordinance 
is applied. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. V. DeBenedictis, et al., 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Smith 
Investment Company v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245 (Ut. App. 1998). 
25- Under a facial challenge and claim of taking, a regulatory taking may be found if: 
(a) There is a denial of economically viable use of the property as a result of the 
regulatory imposition; 
(b) The property owner has distinct investment-backed expectations; and 
(c) The interest in the property that was "taken" is recognized in state law as an 
interest not otherwise subject to regulation as a nuisance. 
Loveladies Harbor, Inc., et al v. The United States of America, 28 F. 3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
26. While the effect of the current zoning ordinance on the subject property would meet 
the three legal criteria just cited, there is a condition precedent to a valid claim by Petitioner for 
compensation for a regulatory taking. The taking must be of "previously existing rights of property or 
contract." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Put another way, Petitioner must have 
legal "standing" to make any claim for relief. Legal standing requires an actual injury in fact.7 
27. Petitioner acquired the subject property approximately two years after the current 
zoning ordinance was effective and had its devastating economic effect on the subject property. If the prior 
zoning ordinance and its similar prohibition on construction is considered, the regulatory taking of the 
subject property took place as many as 10-15 years prior to Petitioner purchasing the subject property. In 
other words, Petitioner has had no property rights that he legally possessed in the subject property "taken" by 
the County as a result of the application of the current zoning ordinance. He acquired the subject property 
when it was already burdened by the current zoning ordinance, and the County has not taken any action other 
than to apply the current zoning ordinance since Petitioner acquired the subject property.8 That Petitioner 
7
 See Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983) ("The traditional test for standing [is that a] plaintiff must be able to 
show he has suffered some distinct and palpable injury which gives him a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute."); see 
also United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 172, 94 S. Ct. 2940, 2944, 41 L. Ed. 2d 678 (1974). 
paid more than the true current value for the subject property is irrelevant to his lack of standing to make a 
taking claim.9 
28. The denial of Petitioner's request for a variance to construct a residence on the subject 
property was NOT an unconstitutional taking of private property without just compensation. 
CONCLUSION 
AND 
RECOMMENDED A CTION BY THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
Petitioner has not suffered a compensable taking of his property under Chapter 19-93, or 
under the Utah or U.S. Constitutions. The Board of County Commissioners should dismiss the Takings 
Petition without any compensation or reimbursement to the Petitioner of any kind. 
Respectfully submitted as of September 11, 2000. 
A. R. Thorup ' 
Hearing Examiner 
512196 
8
 The denial of Petitioner's variance request was a discretionary action by the County, and does not transform this case from a 
"facial" attack to an "as applied" attack for purposes of analyzing Petitioner's standing to claim compensation for a regulatory 
taking under the Utah or U.S. Constitutions. The County made no additional exactions over what is required in the ordinance 
itself. 
If a claim for compensation existed for a regulatory taking of the subject property, such a claim would have matured at the 
effective date of the first zoning ordinance to impose an effective prohibition against constructing a residence on the subject 
property. The County's testimony places this date sometime in the 1980's or early 1990's. Even if the claim for compensation 
"ran with the land", a conclusion that I do not make, it would appear that the statute of limitations on such a claim would have long 
since run. 
ADDENDUM NO. 4 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
400 Deseret Building 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
Facsimile: (801) 532-7543 
A. Robert Thorup Direct Line: (801) 323-3359 
Email: rthorup@rqn.com 
BY FIRST CLASS MAIL 
July 18,2001 
Calvin K. Schneller 
Division Director 
Planning and Development Services Division 
Public Works Department 
Salt Lake County 
2001 South State Street 
Suite N3600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-4200 
Re: Takings Petition of Jason Arnell under Chapter 19-93 
Dear Mr. Schneller: 
As you may recall, I was retained as an independent hearing officer to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing and to render a recommended decision in the matter of the takings 
petition filed by Jason Arnell regarding his lot in the Forest Glen subdivision in Big 
Cottonwood Canyon. Pursuant to this assignment I conducted evidentiary hearings, heard 
and received legal argument. After consideration of the facts and law, including the 
inability of the parties to stipulate to basic requirements like jurisdiction and standing, I 
rendered my recommended decision denying the petition, and delivered my written 
decision to Mr. Tom Shafer (the person who hired me to conduct the hearing) on 
September 12, 2000. In my cover letter, I indicated my assumption that a copy would be 
sent by Mr. Shafer to Mr. Arnell and to Mr. Arnell's counsel. In the package sent to Mr. 
Shafer, as is my practice with the County, I sent my bill for the costs of the hearings and 
the decision. 
A week later, on September 18, 2000, I write to Mr. Shafer to reduce my fee for the 
Arnell matter based on a total cap on my contract that I learned about in acting as a 
hearing officer for the Health Department. 
Calvin Schneller 
July 18,2001 
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On October 6, I received a letter from David West, counsel for Mr. Arnell, asking for 
me to reconsider my recommended decision and seeking a hearing on this request. Given 
my sensitivity to the cost issue raised in my September 18 letter, I wrote to Mr. Shafer on 
October 6 sending him a copy of Mr. West's letter and asking if the County desired that I 
conduct further hearings and proceedings in response to Mr. West's letter1. ( I attach a 
copy of my October 6 letter and Mr. West's October 4 letter). 
On October 12, Kent Lewis Esq. of the District Attorney's office wrote to me 
indicating that the issue was to be on the County Commission agenda on October 18 and 
that the Commission would decide if it wanted further proceedings on the Arnell matter. (I 
attach a copy of Mr. Lewis' letter.) 
I never heard another word from Mr. Lewis or anyone at the County as to the 
disposition of the Arnell matter or Mr. West's request by the Commission. Some months 
after October, 2000, I talked with Pepper Moessinger in your office and asked about the 
status of the Arnell matter. I believe that I also called Mr. Shafer with the same inquiry. I 
recall that both Ms. Moessinger and Mr. Shafer told me that the County was working with 
Mr. Arnell and that a resolution of the case was expected. With the passage of time, I 
assumed that the case had been resolved and that Mr. Arnell was either building or 
compensated or on his way to a lawsuit against his seller, or something. In any event, I 
assumed that I was to conduct no further proceedings. 
Mr. West has informed me that during this same time period (since October 2000), 
he called Mr. Shafer and was told that the County was waiting for me to conduct further 
proceedings and could not explain my delay in holding a new hearing and reconsidering 
my decision. Obviously my reputation with Mr. West and others has been unfairly harmed 
by the County failing to respond to my inquiries while at the same time blaming me for 
delays in resolving the matter. 
Believing that the matter was over, and not being aware of the misinformation being 
given to Mr. West in the interim, I blithely sent a copy of a new Supreme Court decision to 
Jeff Thorpe and to Mr. West on July 5, 2001, acting as one lawyer to another in a friendly 
manner discussing a later development that was germane to an issue we had labored on 
together in the past. My letter spurred Mr. West to write to me on July 10 chastising me for 
failing to respond to his October petition for rehearing. (A copy of Mr. West's letter is 
enclosed.) This letter shocked me and I immediately dashed off a letter on July 12 
restating what I thought Mr. West had learned from my letter of October 6, 2000: that I did 
As you can see, I intended to send a copy of my October 6 letter to Mr. West. He has informed me 
that he never received my October 6 letter. My secretary must have fowled up and I apologize to Mr. 
West. 
Calvin Schneller 
July 18, 2001 
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not have the authority to sua sponte order a new hearing, but was waiting for the County to 
decide if it desired more proceedings at my level or at the Commission (now Council) level 
( a copy of my letter is attached). 
On July 17, 2001 I met with Mr. West in the context of an ecclesiastical relationship 
that has just recently arisen. In this meeting, I learned of Mr. West's anger over the poor 
treatment he and his client have received, that Mr. West did not ever receive a copy of my 
October 6 letter, and that Mr. West had been repeatedly told by the County that I was the 
cause of delay in not moving ahead with a new hearing on the petition for reconsideration. 
As I have compared what I learned from Mr. West with my own files and notes, I must 
agree that since my delivery of my decision to the County, the County has handled this 
matter poorly at best, and has hurt me in the process. 
I am writing this letter for several reasons: 
1. You need to be aware of the keystone cops process being employed in this 
matter, with my calls and letters saying one thing and communications to Mr. West saying 
another. 
2. You need to be aware that I am personally offended by what appears to be 
harm unreasonably inflicted on my reputation. 
3. You need to be aware that because of the ecclesiastical relationship that has 
recently arisen between Mr. West and me, I cannot take any further role in this matter. 
4. You need to be aware that my recommended decision turned on my legal 
conclusion that Mr. Arnell had no standing to seek redress of a taking claim, because the 
claim arose when the property was owned by another person. On June 28, 2001 the 
Supreme Court of the United States issued its decision in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. The 
Court held that taking claims arising in an earlier property owner could be asserted by the 
subsequent owner (a copy of this case is attached). To the extent that the Arnell taking 
claim is still pending final action in County, or even if it is ripe for judicial review, it is clear 
that the Palazzolo case overrules my recommended decision, and will govern subsequent 
proceedings. (My recommended decision found that a taking had occurred without just 
compensation except for the standing issue.) 
(see next page for copied persons) 
ruly yours, 
Calvin Schneller 
• Firlv 18. 2001 
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Copies with all enclosures: 
Kent Lewis Esq., Deputy District Attorney 
Jeffrey Thorpe, Esq., Deputy District Attorney 
j/T3avid West, Esq., Counsel for Mr. Arnell 
ADDENDUM NO. 5 
BEFORE THE SALT LAKE COUNTY COUNCIL 
In Re: The Matter of James Arnell 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Findings of Fact 
1. On May 4, 1999, Jason P. Arnell ("Arnell"), a self-described commercial 
building contractor experienced in hillside development, purchased lot 13, in Forest Glen 
Subdivision plat "B," (" ArnelFs lot") for the purchase price of $95,000 (Affidavit of Jason 
P. Arnell Takings Relief Petition). Forest Glen subdivision was created in 197 L ArnelFs 
entire lot is on slopes greater than forty percent. 
2. Prior to the issuance of a building permit to construct a home on the lot, 
staff advised Arnell that a variance to allow development on slopes greater than forty 
percent would have to be approved by the Board of Adjustment. The Foothills and 
Canyons Overlay Zone Ordinance ("FCOZ") prohibits the building of a dwelling on slope 
angles in excess of thirty percent, with an exception provision for lots of record with 
slopes less than 40%. Petitioner's lot exceeds both the general slope requirement and the 
special exception for lots of record. 
3. The Wasatch Canyons Master Plan, adopted in March 1989, incorporates 
zoning provisions designed to "mitigate against erosion from development" and 
discourages development on slopes in excess of 30% (page 15). In fact, development on 
slopes in excess of thirty percent has been restricted or prohibited in Salt Lake County for 
twenty seven years under the Forestry and Recreation Zone of 1974, the Hillside 
Protection Ordinance of 1980 and FCOZ of 1997. The slope restriction is a key feature of 
these zoning ordinances. 
4. Chapter 19.72 of FCOZ states the purposes for the slope restriction: 
• the encouragement of development that fits the natural slope of the land and 
minimizes the scarring and erosion affects of cutting, filling, and grading 
related to construction on hillsides, ridge lines, and steep slopes; 
• the prohibition of activities and uses that would result in degradation of 
fragile soils, steep slopes, and water quality; 
• the preservation of the visual and aesthetic qualities of (our canyon 
environs) which are vital to the attractiveness and economic viability of the 
county. 
5. On February 16, 2000, the Board of Adjustment denied ArnelFs request for 
a variance, concluding that the variance did not meet State and County requirements for a 
variance, namely that the hardship created by the zoning ordinance was necessary to carry 
out the general purpose of the ordinance and granting the variance would defeat the spirit 
of the zoning ordinance and would not result in substantial justice. (See State and County 
criteria for granting/denying a variance, section 19.92.042B, County Ordinances; and 17-
27-707(2)(a), Utah Code. Annot.) 
6. Having been denied a variance, Arnell filed a Takings Relief Petition with 
the Salt Lake County Commission on March 14, 2000. The Commission appointed a^  
hearing officer, Robert J. Thorup ("Thorup"). After lengthy hearings and consideration 
of written arguments, Thorup concluded in a non-binding advisory opinion issued to the 
Salt Lake County Commission on September 25,2000, that the slope restrictions in FCOZ, 
section 19.93, did not cause or result in a compensable or unconstitutional taking of 
ArnelFs property under Utah or U.S. Constitutions. Thorup recommended that the 
Commission dismiss Arnelfs Takings Petition without any compensation or reimbursement 
of any kind. 
7. On November 1, 2000, the Board of County Commissioners continued for 
six months a final decision on Arnell's Takings Relief Petition, which was again continued 
by the County Council on June 12, 2001 for six months at Arnell's request, to allow time 
for the parties to "conduct further investigation" and explore mutually acceptable 
solutions. Arnell provided general information but unsatisfactory site-specific geotechnical 
data, evidence of water and sewer access, and related structural design. 
8. On July 18, 2001, Thorup notified the County by letter of a United States 
Supreme Court Case, Palazzola v. Rhode Island (decided June 28, 2001) that had not been 
considered in his earlier recommendations. However, in the same letter, Thorup noted that 
he could not take "any further role in this matter" due to an "ecclesiastical relationship that 
has recently arisen between counsel for the petitioner and me." 
9. On November 13, 2001, the County Council reviewed Arnell's Takings 
Relief Petition, heard legal arguments concerning the scope and meaning of Palazzola, 
voted down a motion to rehear the matter before another hearing officer, and denied 
Arnell's petition for a building permit or compensation subject to the approval of findings 
of fact and conclusions of law to be drafted by the District Attorney's office. 
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Conclusions of Law 
1. The County's master plan and zoning ordinance are designed to protect the 
watershed, mountainside, property owners, and the public from dangers inherent in 
building on steep slopes, particularly during times of high precipitation. Any diminution 
of Arneirs property value is primarily due to the subdividor's failure to cluster or plat 
buildable lots consistent with the natural lay of the land. The problems associated with 
building on steep mountainous terrain were evident in 1971 when the Forest Glen plat was 
recorded. Moreover, the plat could have been amended at any time in subsequent years to 
reflect important changes in master plans and zoning regulations. 
2. Essentially, Arnell purchased a steep lot that is nearly impossible to service, 
protect, and develop in an environmentally sensitive manner. Presumably, that is why the 
lot was not purchased for nearly thirty years after it was recorded. It is a buffer lot or 
natural view lot that has value especially when connected to a lot with development 
potential. The County did not mislead Arnell, act in arbitrary or illegal fashion, create the 
slope, nor cause the development problems associated with steep terrain. The prior 
developer or Arnell knew or should have known of the problems inherent in steep slope 
development. However, while Arneirs actual or imputed notice of FCOZ was a basis for 
Hearing Officer Thorup's recommendation, this Council puts greater weight on the 
following considerations: 
3. Due to absorption limitations on steep slopes, state and local health 
authorities preclude construction of sewer drain fields on steep slopes. Arnell has stated 
that he can connect to a sewer but has not demonstrated that he has, or can obtain, legal 
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access across other private properties to a sewer line some 800 feet downhill in Big 
Cottonwood Canyon. Until such time as the Forest Glen subdivision is put on sewer, 
development on steep lots may be unfeasible. 
4. Arnell proposes to build in a subdivision not currently serviced by a State 
approved water system in compliance with Utah drinking water standards. While others 
may have been permitted to build without adequate water in the past, Arnell is nevertheless 
required by state law to have a year-round supply of safe water for household use and fire 
protection. 
5. Construction of a home on steep slopes, such as on the Arnell lot, presents a 
host of other problems and dangers that cannot be readily anticipated or mitigated, 
including the threat of slope instability, foundation slippage, soil erosion, avalanche, fire, 
landslide, falling trees and boulders, retaining wall failure, and aesthetic impacts, not to 
mention off-site impacts such as septic and irrigation runoff. 
6. While engineers can technically design structures on steeper slopes, the 30% 
slope limitation reflects nationwide standards that balance protection of property rights 
with protection of the health, safety, and welfare of the property owner, adjoining property 
owners, and the general public. Regulation of home building on mountainous slopes is a 
common, necessary, and proper exercise of police power that increases overall safety and 
value in property. 
7. The effect of granting an exception to, or compensating, Arnell might be 
that the County is obligated to grant similar relief to other lot owners similarly situated in 
existing and future subdivisions, effectively rescinding residential building restrictions on 
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slopes that have been accepted by property owners and developers and enforced in the 
County for well for over 25 years. Granting an exception would defeat the purpose of the 
Wasatch Canyon Master Plan and FCOZ and would result in manifest injustice to those 
who have complied in the past and will do so in the future. 
Adoption of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Based on the foregoing, the Salt Lake County Council hereby approves the above 
Findings and Conclusions in support of its November 13 motion to deny Jason P. Arnell' s 
petition for a building permit or compensation. 
DATED this 8th day of _ January , 2001 
ATTEST: 
^^JUJ J^2J 
Salt Lake County Clerk 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
Salt Utepounty District Attorns 
Date is %<)0 
SALT LAKE COUNTY COUNCIL 
Chairman 
Voting: 
Councilman Bradley "Aye" 
Councilman Harmsen "Aye" 
Councilman Hatch "Aye'1 
Councilman Hendrickson " A y e " 
Councilman Horiuchi "Aye" 
Councilman Jensen absent 
Councilman Skousen "Aye" 
Councilman Wilde "Aye" 
Councilman Wilkinson "Aye" 
Findings of fact/h/share/tchriste/word 
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following: 
Donald H. Hansen 
2001 S State Street, S3400 
Salt Lake City UT 84190-1210 
Attorney for Salt Lake County 
Barnard N. Madsen 
FILLMORE BELLISTON SHEFFIELD & MADSEN 
4692 N 300 W, Suite 200 
Provo UT 84604 
Attorney for Defendant Truman G. Madsen 
